A Theory of Capital Controls as Dynamic Terms-of-Trade Manipulation
By Arnaud Costinot, Guido Lorenzoni, I. Werning. Journal of Political Economy, 2014
162 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a124360d5c0c72f35152d04bd7d754f6fda89adc
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Emmanuel Farhi
- I. Werning
- Ricardo J. Caballero
- Anton Korinek
- Xavier Gabaix
- Ludwig Straub
- V. Ramey
- Florin O. Bilbiie
In Finance
- Emmanuel Farhi
- I. Werning
- Ricardo J. Caballero
- Anton Korinek
- Hélène Rey
- P. Gourinchas
- Atif R. Mian
- V. Ramey
Citations in the corpus
- Capital Flow Management Measures: What Are They Good For? (2014, unknown): “10 See Dehejia and Wahba (2002) and Angrist and Pischke (2008, chapter 3) for excellent summaries of this methodology. Also see Heinrich, Maffioli, and Vazquez (2010) for a non-technical overview.”
- Dealing with the Trilemma: Optimal Capital Controls with Fixed Exchange Rates (2012, unknown): “This issue is discussed in detail in Costinot et al. (2011). The result can be understood by noting that capital controls, by allowing a country to reallocate demand intertemporally, allow this country to manipulate its terms of trade, raising them in some periods and lowering them in others.”
- Optimal Capital Controls and Real Exchange Rate Policies: A Pecuniary Externality Perspective (2015, unknown): “CN : u 0(CSP t )C SP CN = SP 2;t ; (17) Bt+1 : SP 1;t = SP t + (1 + r)Et SP 1;t+1 : (18)”
- Dilemma Not Trilemma? Capital Controls and Exchange Rates with Volatile Capital Flows (2014, methodology): “With extreme home bias in consumption (α = 0), optimal capital controls are inde- 9The intuition is similar to that discussed in Costinot et al. (2011). terminate.”
- Capital Flows and Foreign Exchange Intervention (2019, unknown): “This logic is similar to Costinot et al. (2014), where the planner wishes to manipulate the dynamic path of the terms of trade in order to maximize the present discounted value of a time-varying endowment.”
- The financial resource curse (2013, unknown): “In Costinot et al. (2011) and De Paoli and Lipinska (2012) capital controls can increase welfare by affecting the terms of trade, while Bacchetta et al. (2011) show that capital controls can have a positive effect on welfare when the domestic financial sector is underdeveloped.”
- Bubble Thy Neighbor: Portfolio Effects and Externalities from Capital Controls (2012, unknown): “Only two recent theoretical papers (Korinek, 2011 and Costinot et al., 2011) consider these multilateral effects of capital controls and model how controls in one country can affect welfare in other countries.”
- Regulating Capital Flows to Emerging Markets: An Externality View (2018, unknown): “However, Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) note that risky forms of finance are pervasive even among firms that are unlikely to be bailed out, and in most emerging market crises government bailouts are not sufficient to cover most of the firms that go bankrupt.”