Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction

By Colin F. Camerer. 2003

5,019 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/02954dd24ddd69650ad9db634ed945c27a892a76

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Citations in the corpus

Customer Behavior Modeling in Revenue Management and Auctions: A Review and New Research Opportunities (2007, background): “How do behavioral considerations affect the way consumers interact strategically with one another and with the seller (see Camerer 2003)?”
Trust games: A meta-analysis (2011, background): “The amount passed by the sender is said to capture trust, ‘‘a willingness to bet that another person will reciprocate a risky move (at a cost to themselves),’’ and the amount returned to the trustor by the trustee to capture trustworthiness (Camerer, 2003, p. 85).”
Individual and cultural learning in stag hunt games with multiple actions (2010, background): “Given the variety of potential learning rules, we feel it necessary to motivate our decision to compare individual, belief-based learning to cultural evolutionary learning (Camerer 2003, Fudenberg and Levine 1999).”
Axiomatic reference-dependence in behavior toward others and toward risk (2006, background): “…Other-regarding preferences, risk, separability, axiomatic foundation, prospect theory JEL codes: D81, D64 For overviews of the experiments, see Sobel (2001) and Camerer (2003).1 Recent examples of models include Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels2 (2000), and Charness and Rabin (2002).”
Tribal Social Instincts and the Cultural Evolution of Institutions to Solve Collective Action Problems (2012, unknown): “Adhering to a norm—a notion of how one ought to behave— can become a goal in itself (Camerer 2003).”
Credit Reporting, Relationship Banking, and Loan Repayment (2007, unknown): “It has been shown that, in a wide range of economic settings, the behavior of some people is also driven by social motives (for an overview see, e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 2002 and Camerer, 2003).”
Recipient design in human communication: simple heuristics or perspective taking? (2012, background): “Several semiotic games have been developed and studied (Camerer, 2003; Weber and Camerer, 2003; Galantucci, 2005; Selten and Warglien, 2007; Scott-Phillips et al., 2009; Feiler and Camerer, 2010), with the TCG being one of the few that has been studied both from a behavioral and neuroscientific…”
The Promise and Success of Lab-Field Generalizability in Experimental Economics: A Critical Reply to Levitt and List (2011, methodology): “The overall rate of giving is about 15% [Camerer, 2003: Ch. 2]. A benchmark for giving in the field is the rate of typical charitable contribution as a fraction of income, which are typically around 1%, so it is true that experimental subjects in many dictator games do give a larger fraction of unea”
Playing repeated games with large language models (2023, unknown): “A: Option J In round 1, you chose Option F and the other player chose Option J .”
Microfoundations for Strategy: A Goal-Framing Perspective on the Drivers of Value Creation (2013, unknown): “Experimental game theory has produced very similar findings (e.g., Camerer, 2003).”
Coordinate to cooperate or compete: Abstract goals and joint intentions in social interaction (2016, unknown): “ences used in behavioral game theory but extend those models to consider how different agents might be differentially valued (Camerer, 2003).”
Nonhuman Species’ Reactions to Inequity and their Implications for Fairness (2006, background): “In behavioral economics, it is often referred to as inequity aversion, and the bulk of research relates to how humans respond to situations involving division of cash (e.g. Camerer, 2003).”