Evolutionary Implementation and Congestion Pricing

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ON THE GLOBAL CONVERGENCE OF STOCHASTIC FICTITIOUS PLAY (2002, methodology): “Then if we define W : R0 n → R via equation (9), Theorem 26.5 of Rockafellar (1970) implies that ∇W ≡ C on R0 n .”
Potential Games with Continuous Player Sets (2001, methodology): “In Sandholm [ 30 ], we use this observation as the basis for an evolutionary approach to implementation theory.”
A survey on networking games in telecommunications (2006, unknown): “As an application evolutionary game to congestion problems, we refer to [181].”
Negative Externalities and Evolutionary Implementation (2005, methodology): “We therefore conclude from condition (PC) that g(z) = 0.”
Joint Strategy Fictitious Play with Inertia for Potential Games (2005, background): “As discussed earlier, the significance of convergence is that an equilibrium may be designed by a global planner as a desirable traffic pattern [10].”