Potential Games with Continuous Player Sets

By William H. Sandholm. Journal of Economics Theory, 2001

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ON THE GLOBAL CONVERGENCE OF STOCHASTIC FICTITIOUS PLAY (2002, background): “4.2 Potential Games Potential games include pure coordination games and congestion games, and also arise in applications of evolutionary techniques to implementation problems (see Sandholm (2000)).”
Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics (2011, background): “8The converse of this condition, that all Nash equilibria are rest points, follows easily from condition (PC); see Sandholm (2001).”
Evolutionary Implementation and Congestion Pricing (2002, methodology): “In particular, Sandholm (2001), building on work of Beckmann, McGuire, and Winsten (1956), Rosenthal (1973), and Monderer and Shapley (1996), establishes the following result.”
A survey on networking games in telecommunications (2006, background): “[36] as well as the routing games in [1] used heavily throughout transportation planning (see in particular [88,89]).”
Game Theory in Wireless and Communication Networks (2008, background): “A population game [421] with a continuum player set (i.”
Negative Externalities and Evolutionary Implementation (2005, methodology): “In Sandholm (2002), we took advantage of this feature by using a "reduced form" model of the evolution of behavior, an approach that cannot be extended to settings with multidimensional types.”