Democracy and development: political institutions and well-being in the world, 1950-1990

By A. Ramos. 2006

2,180 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/013213c166529aa4cc2f1e06778f8403121945f4

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Citations in the corpus

Democracy and armed conflict (2014, background): “First, if the economic underpinnings for democracy were sufficient for citizens’ welfare, we would not have seen the systematic trend of transitions toward democracy when states become economically more developed (Przeworski et al., 2000; Boix, 2003, 2011). Because of commitment problems, the ‘invis”
A Complete Data Set of Political Regimes, 1800–2007 (2013, methodology): “…results in the transition literature, such as the finding that economic development relates to democratic stability more strongly than to democratization (Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Przeworski et al. 2000; Boix and Stokes 2003), are not easily replicable using a continuous measure of democracy.”
Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats (2007, methodology): “There are prima facie indications that a more frequent turnover of authoritarian rulers shortens the life of authoritarian regimes: Using the Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (2000) data shows that the probability of an autocracy dying in a particular year increases when the moving averag”
Political institutions and developmental governance in sub-Saharan Africa (2004, background): “The relationship between material well-being and democracy is complex, but the worldwide record of the past half century shows that rising national income makes democratic regimes more durable (Przeworski et al. 2000).”
Votes and Vetoes: The Political Determinants of Commercial Openness (2006, background): “Indeed, the hallmark of democracy is the existence of regular, open, and fair elections involving candidates who compete for the votes of a large portion of the adult population (e.g., Huntington 1991: 5-13; Przeworski et al. 2000; Schumpeter 1942).”
The Economic Origins of Democracy Reconsidered (2012, methodology): “He used a dynamic probit model to predict transitions in Przeworski et al.’s measure of regime. Rodriquez and Ortega’s (2006) data were used by Houle to measure”
Response to David J. Samuels and Ben W. Ansell’s review of From Open Secrets to Secret Voting: Democratic Electoral Reforms and Voter Autonomy (2014, background): “As evidenced by the brief and cavalier treatment of the issue in Przeworski et al. (2000), the issue of inequality was largely sidestepped in most research, partly (if not mainly) because no good data existed.”
Democracy, State Capacity, and Economic Growth (2013, background): “Most episodes of economic stagnation and decline globally have come in dictatorial countries (Przeworski et al., 2000) although some dictatorships, particularly in Asia after 1960, have experienced high growth.”
The Dynamics of Political Embeddedness in China* (2017, neutral): “In countries like Poland and Romania, democratic institutions have developed, while in countries like China and Russia, political institutions have remained authoritarian (Whitley, 1999; Przeworski et al., 2000).”
Why some countries thrive despite corruption: The role of trust in the corruption–efficiency relationship (2010, background): “Przeworski et al. (2000) find that regime type does not have a significant effect on development, whereas Barro (1997) finds a nonlinear relationship between the two.”