Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats

By J. Gandhi, A. Przeworski. 2007

1,291 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Political Science and International Relations, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6af9ace712327e85acd6011ca6d67bd5c341e687

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Citations in the corpus

Unbundling the Relationship between Authoritarian Legislatures and Political Risk (2014, neutral): “In practice, this 120 Gandhi and Przeworski 2007.”
The Tragedy of the Nomenklatura: Career Incentives and Political Radicalism during China's Great Leap Famine (2010, neutral): “…the seminal work by Downs (1957), little progress has been made toward understanding the institutional structure and dynamics of totalitarian regimes (Debs 2010; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007), despite the fact that dictators still rule almost half of the world’s population (Egorov and Sonin n.d.).”
More effective than we thought: Central bank independence and inflation in developing countries (2020, neutral): “Finally, our results contribute to the growing literature studying the effects of political and monetary institutions in autocracies (Bodea et al., 2019; Boix and Svolik, 2013; Gandhi, 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Gehlbach and Keefer, 2012; Magaloni, 2008).”
Beyond Clientelism (2008, positive): “Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) argue that in contrast to distributive concerns, the resolution of internal regime conflict necessitates legislatures and other formal state institutions.”
Does Performance Matter? Evaluating Political Selection Along the Chinese Administrative Ladder (2018, background): “…the importance of formal institutions, such as parties, legislatures, and advisory councils, for regime survival (e.g., Boix & Svolik, 2013; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007; Wright & EscribàFolch, 2012), we turn to another important yet neglected factor—the selection of local politicians—to…”
Firm lobbying and influence in developing countries: a multilevel approach (2012, methodology): “In Columns 6–7, I divide the sample according to the Gandhi and Przeworski binary democracy-autocracy regime type classification (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Gandhi 2008) to test whether the determinants of influence are sensitive to the political environment.”
Democratic Authoritarianism: Origins and Effects (2014, background): “Legislatures help regimes identify discontent because they allow elected politicians to make demands on the government on behalf of their constituents (Gandhi 2008, Gandhi & Przeworski 2007).”
Electoral manipulation as bureaucratic control (2013, background): “…Way, 2002, 2010; Howard and Roessler, 2006; Schedler, 2006; Hyde and Marinov, 2012), part of a more general phenomenon of democratic-seeming institutions in authoritarian settings (e.g., Lust-Okar, 2006; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Gandhi, 2008; Gehlbach and Keefer, 2012; Boix and Svolik, 2013).”
Empowering activists or autocrats? The Internet in authoritarian regimes (2015, neutral): “Thus, rephrasing Mussolini, the Internet may be the modern version of the capillary through which the blood of the dictatorship diffuses through society (see Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007: 1283).”
The Adverse Effects of Sunshine: A Field Experiment on Legislative Transparency in an Authoritarian Assembly (2012, neutral): “…they may be highly active, the primary role of national parliaments is to serve as forums where “demands can be revealed without appearing as acts of resistance . . . and where the resulting agreements can be dressed in a legalistic form and publicized as such” (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007, 1282).”