Of What Value are Shareholder Proposals Sponsored by Public Pension Funds

By Andrew K. Prevost, R. Rao. 2000

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INVESTOR ACTIVISM, MANAGERIAL RESPONSIVENESS, AND CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE (2007, unknown): “First, does activism discipline managers to improve CSP (as implied by Johnson and Greening, 1999) or does it merely signal the inability or unwillingness of managers to improve CSP (Prevost and Rao, 2000)?”
The role of shareholder proposals in corporate governance (2011, background): “Prevost and Rao (2000) point out that they often signal previously failed private negotiations with management, and may exert no discipline anyhow due to their nonbinding nature.”
Corporate Governance, Corporate Ownership, and the Role of Institutional Investors: A Global Perspective (2003, unknown): “(1999), and Prevost and Rao (2000).”
Shareholder Activism through Proxy Proposals: The European Perspective (2010, unknown): “However, Prevost and Rao (2000) point out that even if they pass the shareholder vote, proxy proposals are likely to be ineffective in disciplining management because they are nonbinding under the SEC‟s Rule 14a-8.”
Thirty Years of Shareholder Activism: A Survey of Empirical Research (2017, unknown): “Author(s) Time period of events covered Data source(s) Type(s) of activism Sponsor(s) Nelson (2006b) 1990-2003 CalPERS Focus List, Wall Street Journal NS CalPERS Nesbitt (1994) 1992-1993 CalPERS SP CalPERS Norli, Ostergaard, and Schindele (2015) 1994-2007 PREC14A, PREN14A, PRRN14A, DEFC14A, DEFN14A,”