An Evaluation of 'Essays on Disclosure' and the Disclosure Literature in Accounting
By Ronald A. Dye. 2001
693 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Marketing
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fed8dba090701ae81869b22520a74cf16bab1c83
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Beatriz García Osma
- Juan Manuel García Lara
- Qiang Cheng
- Fernando Penalva
- Rodrigo S. Verdi
- Martin Walker
- Collins G. Ntim
- Ole‐Kristian Hope
In Finance
- Qiang Cheng
- Rodrigo S. Verdi
- Beatriz García Osma
- Juan Manuel García Lara
- Fernando Penalva
- Shivaram Rajgopal
- Nemit Shroff
- Shuping Chen
In Marketing
- Christopher Marquis
- Yanhua Zhou
- Saverio Bozzolan
- J. Danbolt
- H. Bauwhede
- Qiang Cheng
- Shivaram Rajgopal
- Dawn A. Matsumoto
Citations in the corpus
- Forward-Looking Disclosures, Financial Verifiability and Analysts' Forecasts: A Study of Cross-Listed European Firms (2009, background): “This result is consistent with both the theoretical analysis of Harris and Raviv (1993), and the empirical results of Barron et al.”
- Determinants of Disclosure Noncompliance and the Effect of the SEC Review: Evidence from the 2006 Mandated Compensation Disclosure Regulations (2011, background): “Disclosure of detailed executive compensation targets could reduce firm value because of proprietary costs (Dye 2001; Verrecchia 2001).”
- Analyst Coverage and the Cost of Raising Equity Capital: Evidence from Underpricing of Seasoned Equity Offerings (2008, background): “However, financial analysts recently have faced increased scrutiny from investors and regulators, who are concerned with analysts’ 1 See Dye (2001) and Verrecchia (2001) for reviews of the related theoretical literature.”
- Required Disclosures in Financial Reports (2007, background): “3 For discussions of analytical research in accounting, finance, and economics on (primarily) voluntary disclosures, see, for example, Verrecchia (2001) and Dye (2001).”
- Is silence golden? An empirical analysis of firms that stop giving quarterly earnings guidance (2005, background): “3.1.2 Usefulness of earnings guidance Dye (2001) argues that managers have incentives to make voluntary accounting disclosures which investors find useful in assessing firm value.”
- Accounting Disclosure and Real Effects (2007, background): “Instead, I dwell exclusively on the real effects approach to the study of disclosure, an approach that is also advocated by Dye (2001), but inadequately discussed in Verrecchia’s survey.”
- The Relative Value Relevance of Shareholder Versus Stakeholder Corporate Governance Disclosure Policy Reforms in South Africa (2012, positive): “for corporate disclosures (Core, 2001; Dye, 2001), firms that commit to greater levels of transparency on shareholder CG practices distinguish themselves by sending a credible signal about their intention of aligning their interests with those of existing and future investors (Sheu et”
- Voluntary disclosure of information when firms are uncertain of investor response (2007, neutral): “To cite Dye (1998), uncertainty regarding the response of investors is .”
- The effects of financial reporting and disclosure on corporate investment: A review (2019, background): “2 See also Core (2001), Dye (2001), Magee (2001), Sloan (2001), and Brickley and Zimmerman (2010) for discussions of these literatures.”
- Disclosure Quality, Cost of Capital, and Investor Welfare (2008, neutral): “The investment effect of disclosure in my analysis draws heavily on the research about the 9Interested readers are referred to Hirshleifer (1971); Hakansson et al. (1982); Ross (1989); Dye (2001); Verrecchia (2001); Christensen et al. (2008); Lambert and Verrecchia (2009).”