On Dynamic Principal-Agent Problems in Continuous Time

By Noah Williams. 2004

169 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/feab9a1f063ed98d3c9a79966a6f6ec6d9449678

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

1. Jakša Cvitanić
2. Jianfeng Zhang
3. Xuhu Wan
4. Yuliy Sannikov
5. Noah Williams
6. Christian Bender
7. Adrien Richou
8. Bruno Bouchard

Citations in the corpus

• Optimal Compensation with Hidden Action and Lump-Sum Payment in a Continuous-Time Model (2009, background): “The paper closest to ours is Williams [29].”
• Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time (2007, background): “Sannikov (2004) and Williams (2004) both introduce a new method of analyzing the informational problem in a dynamic principal-agent relationship.”
• A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal-Agent (2005, background): “Figure 3 shows several typical solutions of equation (13) marked by A, B and C.”