Earnings Management to Avoid Earnings Declines across Publicly and Privately Held Banks

By Anne L. Beatty, Bin Ke, K. Petroni. 2002

865 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fe278ea23c9b34c1c1d44d0f28c32fb277c72d9b

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Citations in the corpus

Last‐Chance Earnings Management: Using the Tax Expense to Meet Analysts' Forecasts* (2004, background): “To date, researchers have examined a number of specific accruals to test for earnings management, including bad debt expense (Teoh, Wong, and Rao 1998), loan loss provisions (Beaver, Eger, Ryan, and Wolfson 1989; Wahlen 1994), and claim loss reserves (Petroni 1992; Beaver and McNichols 1998; Beatty”
Self-Selection of Auditors and Audit Pricing in Private Firms (2003, background): “Several recent studies also rely upon the unique or differing attributes of private firms to improve our understanding of issues in financial accounting literature (e.g., Ball and Shivakumar 2002; Beatty et al. 2002; Beaver et al. 2003).”
Cross-country determinants of bank income smoothing by managing loan loss provisions (2008, background): “Only Beatty and Harris (1999) and Beatty et al. (2002) have shown that publicly traded banks engage in income smoothing more than privately owned banks in the US.”
Corporate governance and earnings management at large U.S. bank holding companies (2009, methodology): “Specifically, Beatty et al. (1995) find no relation between loan loss provisions and earnings while Collins et al. (1995) find a positive relation. Scholes et al. (1990) find that capital positions play a role in banks' willingness to realize gains onmunicipal bonds. Collins et al., Beaver and Engel”
Policy uncertainty and loan loss provisions in the banking industry (2020, neutral): “Second, prior literature finds a positive association between loan loss provisions and earnings before loan loss provisions, suggesting that banks discretionarily manage earnings upwards (downwards) when true earnings are low (high) (e.g., Collins et al., 1995; Beatty et al., 2002).”
Corporate social responsibility and earnings management in U.S. banks (2014, methodology): “According to Cornett et al. (2009), LLPs consist f two components: the first component is a non-discretionary that brings LLA to an acceptable level; the second component s discretionary in nature and it is closely regulated (Cornett et al., 2009).”
Evidence from Auditors about Managers' and Auditors' Earnings-Management Decisions (2002, neutral): “‘‘Distributional’’ studies test whether the distribution of earnings around benchmarks differs in some predicted way from what would be expected in the absence of earnings management (e.g., Hayn 1995; Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Burgstahler and Eames 1998; Degeorge et al. 1999; Beatty et al. 2002).”
Have Financial Statements Become Less Informative? Evidence from the Ability of Financial Ratios to Predict Bankruptcy (2005, neutral): “Beatty et al. (2002) use a hazard model to predict the duration of consecutive earnings increases for public and private banks.”
Bank earnings and regulatory capital management using available for sale securities (2017, neutral): “The incentive for non-listed banks to engage in earnings management could stem from depositors (Beatty et al. 2002).”
Auditor Reputation and Earnings Management: International Evidence from the Banking Industry (2010, methodology): “Beatty et al. (2002) and Altamuro and Beatty (2010) report that bank managers have incentives to manage earnings for benchmark-beating behavior.”