Why do people pay taxes? Prospect theory versus expected utility theory

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Tax evasion, tax morale and policy maker's effectiveness (2009, background): “…on an alternative approach to the expected utility theory (e.g. cumulative prospective theory, rank dependent expected utility theory, etc.) as proposed by behavioural economics (e.g. Yaniv, 1999; Eide, 2001; King and Sheffrin, 2002; Arcand and Rota Graziosi, 2005; Dhami and al-Nowaihi, 2007).”
A Note on the Utility Function Under Prospect Theory (2008, background): “Further applications include the explanation of tax evasion (Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007)) and several applications to nance (Thaler (2005)) among others.”
Cheating, emotions, and rationality: an experiment on tax evasion (2010, background): “This higher evasion when income is low could result from the subjects having a reference level of income below which they are willing to take a higher risk of audit for avoiding the pain associated to a certain loss in case of compliance (see Bernasconi and Zanardi 2004; Dhami and Al-Nowaihi 2007, ”
National culture and firm-level tax evasion☆ (2013, background): “For instance, economists question why people or firms pay taxes when the probability of an audit or penalty is so low (Dhami and al-Nowaihi, 2007).”
A Reduced-Form Approach to Behavioral Public Finance (2012, background): “In the case of tax compliance, biases or inaccurate perceptions about audit probabilities, for example, might lead to improved compliance (Dhami & al-Nowaihi 2007, 2010).”