HMQV: A High-Performance Secure Diffie-Hellman Protocol

By Hugo Krawczyk. Annual International Cryptology Conference, 2005

757 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fe082687bbd6a9fbfa22ea814294df485f6b9d19

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Citations in the corpus

Secure Anonymous Key Distribution Scheme for Smart Grid (2016, methodology): “The third one is based on HMQV protocol [26].”
Stronger Security of Authenticated Key Exchange (2006, methodology): “A similar argument was used in the security proofs of the HMQV [12] and KEA+ [15] AKE protocols.”
Provable data possession at untrusted stores (2007, methodology): “The schemes are based on the KEA1 assumption which was introduced by Damgard in 1991 [14] and subsequently used by several others, most notably in [21, 6, 7, 27, 15].”
Cryptographic Extraction and Key Derivation: The HKDF Scheme (2010, methodology): “For example, in a protocol such as MQV (or its provable variant HMQV) [50, 49] one can argue that the shared group element computed by the protocol is hard to fully guess by an attacker but not necessarily hard to distinguish from random group elements.”
Remote data checking using provable data possession (2011, methodology): “The schemes are based on the KEA1 assumption, which was introduced by Damgard in 1991 [Damgard 1992], and subsequently used by several others, most notably in [Hada and Tanaka 1998; Bellare and Palacio 2004a, 2004b; Krawczyk 2005; Dent 2006a].”
A Formal Security Analysis of the Signal Messaging Protocol (2017, background): “While many possible variants of such protocols have been explored in-depth in the literature (HMQV [50], Kudla-Paterson [51], NAXOS [52] among many others), the session key derivation used here is new and not based on one of these standard protocols, though it draws some inspiration from [51].”
Two Birds with One Stone: Two-Factor Authentication with Security Beyond Conventional Bound (2018, background): “C5 is based on the list of basic attacks [35], [36] that a password-only authentication scheme needs to guard against and on security notions [48] that relate to session keys,(2) as well as on new attack vectors”