Provable data possession at untrusted stores

By Giuseppe Ateniese, Randal C. Burns, Reza Curtmola, Joseph Herring, Lea Kissner, Zachary N. J. Peterson, Dawn Song. Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2007

3,442 citations recorded by the source corpus.

We introduce a model for provable data possession (PDP) that allows a client that has stored data at an untrusted server to verify that the server possesses the original data without retrieving it. The model generates probabilistic proofs of possession by sampling random sets of blocks from the server, which drastically reduces I/O costs. The client maintains a constant amount of metadata to verify the proof. The challenge/response protocol transmits a small, constant amount of data, which minimizes network communication. Thus, the PDP model for remote data checking supports large data sets in widely-distributed storage system. We present two provably-secure PDP schemes that are more efficient than previous solutions, even when compared with schemes that achieve weaker guarantees. In particular, the overhead at the server is low (or even constant), as opposed to linear in the size of the data. Experiments using our implementation verify the practicality of PDP and reveal that the performance of PDP is bounded by disk I/O and not by cryptographic computation.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Information Systems

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/67708229c4579adabf7a2fbe0178a610d2eff788

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Artificial Intelligence

  1. Wenjing Lou
  2. Kui Ren
  3. Jonathan Katz
  4. Giuseppe Ateniese
  5. Dan Boneh
  6. Seny Kamara
  7. Brent Waters
  8. Ari Juels

In Information Systems

  1. Wenjing Lou
  2. Kui Ren
  3. Ari Juels
  4. Giuseppe Ateniese
  5. Qian Wang
  6. Seny Kamara
  7. Jonathan Katz
  8. Thomas Ristenpart

Citations in the corpus