Bureaucratic corruption, environmental policy and inbound US FDI: theory and evidence

By Per G. Fredriksson, John A. List, Daniel L. Millimet. 2003

287 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fd9b6eb0a69e6c28560930d6ac65ec8bce39c602

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In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

Political Geography and Stock Returns: The Value and Risk Implications of Proximity to Political Power (2012, unknown): “The conviction rate has been used as a proxy of political corruption by Butler, Fauver, and Mortal (2009), Fisman and Gatti (2002), Fredriksson, List, and Millimet (2003), and Glaeser and Saks (2006), among others.”
FDI and the Capital Intensity of “Dirty” Sectors: A Missing Piece of the Pollution Haven Puzzle (2005, unknown): “Recent evidence that only examines US inward FDI has, however, had more success in finding a PHH effect (see, for example, List et al., 2001; Fredriksson et al., 2003; Keller and Levinson, 2002).3 The wider pollution haven literature that often focuses on trade flows, has also only found weak or…”
Foreign Direct Investment and the Environment (2017, background): “(59) extend this result to illustrate the role played by corruption in influencing regulations.”
Environmental Regulations, Outward FDI and Heterogeneous Firms: Are Countries Used as Pollution Havens? (2012, background): “Finally, we follow Fredriksson et al. (2003) and Cole et al. (2006) by investigating the role of corruption (Corruption) in the context of pollution havens.”
Corruption, Political Connections, and Municipal Finance (2009, methodology): “We measure cross-sectional variation in (the inverse of) states’ political integrity with a widely used proxy, namely, per capita federal corruption convictions (see, for example, Glaeser and Saks (2006), Fisman and Gatti (2002), Fredrickson, et al.”
Are Foreign Investors Attracted to Weak Environmental Regulations? Evaluating the Evidence from China (2005, background): “Third, omission of corruption and other locationspecific attributes can lead to a spurious relationship between FDI and environmental stringency (Javorcik and Wei, 2004; Fredriksson et al., 2003; Keller and Levinson, 2002).”
The relationship between corruption and income inequality in U.S. states: evidence from a panel cointegration and error correction model (2010, methodology): “4 This state convictions data have been used to measure corruption in several studies such as Goel and Rich (1989), Fisman and Gatti (2002), Fredriksson et al. (2003) , Glaeser and Saks (2006), Dincer (2008), and Dincer and Gunalp (2008).”
Corruption is bad for growth (even in the United States) (2011, methodology): “This is the same measure used by Goel and Nelson (1998), Fredricksson et al. (2003) , Depken and LaFountain (2006), and Glaeser and Saks (2006).”
An empirical investigation of the pollution haven effect with strategic environment and trade policy (2009, background): “4 Again, the exceptions being Fredriksson et al. (2003) and Ederington and Minier (2003) who find more substantial effects of U.S. abatement costs on U.S. inward FDI and net imports into the U.S., respectively.”
Institutionalized pollution havens (2009, background): “8 Ederington and Minier (2003) argue that environmental regulations are affected by the level of imports, Fredriksson et al. (2003) discuss the environmental policy effects of corruption and the effect of environmental policy on FDI, and Damania et al. (2003) explore the effects of trade openness…”