Does bank capital affect lending behavior

By L. Gambacorta, P. Mistrulli. 2004

804 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fd762159760287ff6af0c2ad546026af466a2cb3

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Citations in the corpus

Mitigating the pro-cyclicality of basel II (2010, background): “…had the potential to be pro-cyclical because bank profits may turn negative during recessions, impairing banks’ lending capacity (Borio et al., 2001; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004).4 Under the IRB approach of Basel II, capital requirements are an increasing function of the PD, LGD and EAD…”
Internal Capital Markets and Lending by Multinational Bank Subsidiaries (2006, positive): “One explanation for this is that parent banks tend to hold substantial amounts of capital in excess of minimum regulatory capital requirements (e.g. Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004).”
Relationship and Transaction Lending in a Crisis (2013, positive): “This result on the e¤ects of bank capital is in line with the bank lending channel literature which indicates that well-capitalized banks are better able to protect their clients in the case of monetary policy shocks (Kishan and Opiela, 2000; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004).”
Securitisation and the Bank Lending Channel (2007, positive): “After monetary tightening, the response of supplied lending will be less severe for big, liquid and wellcapitalised banks (Kashyap and Stein, 1995, 2000; Kishan and Opiela, 2000; Peek and Rosengren, 1995; Stein, 1998; Van den Heuvel, 2002; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004).”
Regulation, formal and informal enforcement and the development of the household loan market. Lessons from Italy (2005, background): “Mergers played an important role in this 14 Italian financial reforms during the 1980s and early 1990s are discussed in Gambacorta (2003).”
Why Do (or Did?) Banks Securitize Their Loans? Evidence from Italy (2010, methodology): “11 On the use of the solvency ratio as a preferable variable to analyse banks’ conduct, see Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004).”
The Effects of Quantitative Easing on Bank Lending Behavior (2017, neutral): “Kashyap and Stein (2000) elucidate the same mechanisms for banks that hold fewer liquid assets, while Kishan and Opiela (2000), Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) carry out the analysis for banks with higher leverage ratios.”
Pro-Cyclical Capital Regulation and Lending (2016, positive): “Our findings are consistent with earlier research indicating that poorly capitalized banks reduce lending during recessions (Gambacorta and Mistrulli 2004), and that loan supply shocks have a negative effect on real economic activity (Peek and Rosengren 1997, 2000).”