Understanding Financial Crises

By Franklin Allen, Douglas Gale. 2007

597 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fd5f011ef09434a32ac6fc6f0c4c22ca822417eb

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Citations in the corpus

Dynamic Debt Runs (2010, background): “Each of these views has motivated a body of theoretical models of bank runs.4 See Gorton and Winton (2003) and Allen and Gale (2007) for two recent reviews of the history of nancial crises and di¤erent theories of runs.”
Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-08 (2009, unknown): “Anyone who purchased a AAArated tranche of a collateralized debt obligation, combined with a credit default swap, had reason to believe that the investment had low risk, because the probability of the CDS counterparty defaulting was considered to be small.”
Risk, Uncertainty and Monetary Policy (2013, unknown): “In the presence of agency problems, an environment of abundant liquidity may lead banks to finance projects with negative net present value and to over-lend (Allen and Gale (2007)).”
A model of a systemic bank run (2009, unknown): “The cash-in-the-market pricing scenario of Allen and Gale (1994) or Allen and Gale (2007), chapter 4, corresponds to an extreme version of the scenario considered here, with the non-expert investors all bidding zero for all assets and where the core banks cannot raise more liquidity than o.”
Asset Price Bubbles and Systemic Risk (2019, unknown): “Historical accounts of prominent financial bubbles have been given, among others, by Shiller (2000), Garber (2000), Kindleberger and Aliber (2005), Allen and Gale (2007), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), as well as Brunnermeier and Schnabel (2016).”
Financial Stability and Monetary Policy: How Closely Interlinked? (2014, background): “35See also Allen and Gale (2007), Diamond and Rajan (2009), and Acharya and Naqvi (2010). interact and strengthen each other (as in Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009).36 In light of the review of developments in the euro area in section 2, one of the most interesting pieces of research is a series of…”
Institutional development and bank stability: Evidence from transition countries (2014, background): “Take some examples of transition economies to illustrate, the government bailout of bad loans on one hand reduces banks’ credit risk; on the other hand may create abundant liquidity that increases the incentives for over lending and higher risk (Allen and Gale, 2009).”
An Overview of the Crisis: Causes, Consequences, and Solutions (2010, unknown): “As Allen and Gale (2000, 2007) have argued, growth in credit is important for asset price bubbles.”
Bank Risk-Taking, Securitization, Supervision and Low Interest Rates: Evidence from the Euro Area and the U.S. Lending Standards (2010, unknown): “…in banking (due to bail-outs and liquidity assistance), low interest rates may induce banks to soften their lending standards by improving banks’ liquidity (Allen and Gale, 2007; Diamond and Rajan, 2009a; Acharya and Naqvi, 2010) and net worth (Adrian and Shin, 2010; Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2003).”
Microprudential Regulation in a Dynamic Model of Banking (2014, background): “1 model can be viewed as a dynamic infinite–horizon version of the intermediaries studied by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Allen and Gale (2007).”
The Regulatory Responses to the Global Financial Crisis: Some Uncomfortable Questions (2014, background): “, Claessens and Kose, 2014, Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009, Allen and Gale, 2007, Kindleberger, 1978) is that it has been hard to beat the “this-time-is-different” syndrome. This, as aptly described by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), is the belief that “financial crises are things that happen to other people”