The Logic of Political Violence

By T. Besley, Torsten Persson. 2011

508 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Development, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fcfdcc9c171352b94cf95e88e187deb93cae2379

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Citations in the corpus

Taxation and Development (2013, methodology): “To explicitly link up with the data on income taxes vs. trade taxes discussed in Section 3, the argument would have to be recast in a setting where trade rather than consumption is the alternative tax base (see Besley & Persson, 2011c, chap.”
Weak States: Causes and Consequences of the Sicilian Mafia (2019, background): “There is growing evidence that state weakness and the lack of state capacity are important roadblocks on public good provision and economic development (e.g., Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007; Besley and Persson, 2011; Bandyopadhyay and Green, 2012; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013; Acemoglu et al., 20”
US Food Aid and Civil Conflict (2014, background): “2004. “New Data, New Doubts: A Comment on Burnside and Dollar’s ‘Aid, Policies, and Growth’ (2000).” American Economic Review, 94(3): 774–780.”
This Mine is Mine! How Minerals Fuel Conflicts in Africa (2015, unknown): “(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Estimator LPM LPM Dep.”
FRAGILE STATES AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY (2011, unknown): “The modeling approach draws on our earlier work: Besley and Persson (2009, 2010, 2011).7 We develop a two-period approach to investments in state capacity and violence.”
Institutional Corruption and Election Fraud: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan† (2015, background): “…Afghanistan), fair elections may also undermine popular support for insurgents by promoting an accountable and legitimate government and by providing a forum for reconciliation ( Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011; Besley and Persson 2011; McChrystal 2009; United States Army 2006; World Bank 2011 .”
The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict (2012, unknown): “Besley and Persson (2009a) make a similar argument and show that increases in the GDP-weighted prices of countries' commodity exports increase the probability of conflict.”
Making Progress on Foreign Aid (2015, unknown): “The recent study by Besley & Persson (2011) emphasizes the importance of commitment and makes the point that an exogenous increase in government revenues will only increase conflict in the presence of weak institutions or a non-representative government, where the government and opposing factions…”
Can Cultural Norms Reduce Conflicts? Confucianism and Peasant Rebellions in (2014, background): “For example, Besley and Persson (2011) find that the effect of economic shocks on political violence exists only where political institutions are non-cohesive.”
External Shocks, Internal Shots: The Geography of Civil Conflicts (2012, background): “But individual participation also depends on the opportunity cost of fighting, which is itself a positive function of income (Grossman, 1991; Besley & Persson, 2011).”
War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust and Conflict (2011, unknown): “Some existing theories focus on institutional failures, such as weak state capacity and weak institutions (Besley and Persson, 2010, 2011; Fearon, 2005).”
Seeds of distrust: conflict in Uganda (2012, methodology): “Tomakeprogressinthisdirection, we follow Besley and Persson (2011) and split the sample into high-and low-fractionalization counties, instrumenting in each speciﬁcation All ﬁghting with the same geographic characteristics as before.”