A Spatial Theory of News Consumption and Electoral Competition

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Media and Politics (2015, background): “Finally, models with rational voters and informative media invariably conclude that ideological media reinforces prior beliefs and polarizes the electorate, while having small systematic effects on average partisan voting (Bernhardt, Krasa and Polborn, 2008; Chan and Suen, 2008).”
Social Media, News Consumption, and Polarization: Evidence from a Field Experiment (2020, background): “75Delegation has long been suggested as an explanation for why consumers prefer like-minded news (Chan and Suen, 2008; Downs, 1957; Suen, 2004).”
A Spatial Theory of Media Slant and Voter Choice (2011, background): “Chan and Suen (2004) consider a media outlet with policy preferences that can falsify reports about the true state of the world to achieve preferred outcomes. Bernhardt et al. (2008) combine both sides of the market, assuming that two media firms compete for readers who have a preference for stories”
Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver (2017, unknown): “12Another model with similar structure is Chan and Suen (2008).”
Media Mergers and Media Bias with Rational Consumers: Extended Version (2012, background): “Then, an i monopoly is an equilibrium if: Pi(i, β, π) ≥ K and Pj(C, β, π) ≤ K, (17)”