Trust, social capital and economic development

By P. Francois, Ján Zábojník. 2005

217 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fc881135b328a3aad0d30109a20cbd4239eb87de

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Demography

In Economics and Econometrics

In Sociology and Political Science

Citations in the corpus

Social capital vs institutions in the growth process (2009, background): “ing provincial data from Italy, Guiso et al. (2004) nd that the e¤ect of social capital is stronger in provinces where legal enforcement is weaker. Social capital also appears to be more important among the less educated, implying that trust is more important when contracts are regarded as too comp”
The Scope of Cooperation: Norms and Incentives (2007, methodology): “Hauk and Saez Marti (2002), Francois and Zabojnik (2005) and Francois (2006) have applied the methodology pioneered by Bisin and Verdier (2001) to closely related issues.”
Cultural integration and its discontents (2002, unknown): “The importance of cultural factors to public good contribution is emphasized in the recent work of Francois and Zabojnik (2005), discussed below.”
Societal trust and corporate tax avoidance (2018, unknown): “Francois and Zabojnik (2005) assert that societal trust is an example of a social norm.”
Understanding Cultural Persistence and Change (2017, unknown): “Sections A 5 and A 6 report additional ﬁgures and tables that were referenced in the body of the paper, but not reported there.”
Trust, Growth and Well-Being: New Evidence and Policy Implications (2013, unknown): “Frey (1998) shows that tax evasion in Swiss cantons is lower when democratic participation is greater.”
Economic freedom, culture, and growth (2011, background): “This literature asserts that greater levels of trust are consistent with greater economic growth and development (Fukuyama 1996; Knack and Keefer 1997; La Porta et al. 1997; Woolcock 1998; Zak and Knack 2001; Francois and Zabojnik 2005).”
Securing Private Property: Formal versus Informal Institutions (2011, background): “Trust is argued to reduce transactions costs, to lead more quickly to efficient outcomes, and to further market exchange (Fukuyama 1996; La Porta et al. 1997; Woolcock 1998; Zak and Knack 2001; Dixit 2004; Francois and Zabojnik 2005).”
The Scope of Cooperation: Values and Incentives (2008, unknown): “Hauk and Saez Marti (2002), Francois and Zabojnik (2005) and Francois (2006) have applied the methodology pioneered by Bisin and Verdier (2001) to closely related issues.”
Tribal Social Instincts and the Cultural Evolution of Institutions to Solve Collective Action Problems (2012, unknown): “People’s motivations or preferences are partially calibrated to performing the local equilibrium (Francois and Zobojnik 2005; Nunn and Wantchekon 2011; Nunn, in press).”