Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition

By Christian Hellwig, Laura L. Veldkamp. 2007

358 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6f6529c532abc751cbb93e629c484519f2b98e96

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Citations in the corpus

A Theory of Demand Shocks (2009, methodology): “To solve for the matrices Ω I use iterations on the (29).”
Runs on Money Market Mutual Funds (2016, neutral): “Alternative models such as Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009) endogenize the acquisition of information but involve similar trade-offs and will imply similar comparative statics results, i.e., adding a fraction of investors who maintain the status quo weakens the complementarities and thus makes it easier…”
Public and Private Learning from Prices, Strategic Substitutability and Complementarity, and Equilibrium Multiplicity (2011, neutral): “In a model with coordination motives and information choice, Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009) show that for the equilibrium to be unique, signal noise across agents must be independent.”
The Timing of Monetary Policy Shocks (2007, neutral): “The standard interpretation of v p is a combination of various random factors that might a¤ect policy decisions, including data errors and revisions, preferences of participants at the FOMC meetings, politics, etc. (See Bernanke and Mihov 1998).”
Optimal Monetary Policy with Uncertain Fundamentals and Dispersed Information (2009, background): “The solid line represents total welfare, measured by w in (19).”
Endogenous Information, Menu Costs and Inflation Persistence (2008, neutral): “Likewise, Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009) show that allowing firms to choose what information to acquire can lead to multiple equilibria. which summarizes the history of signals.”
Optimal Sticky Prices Under Rational Inattention (2009, neutral): “Furthermore, the fact that n ∆̂it, ẑ ∗ it o is a solution to problem (45)-(48) implies that these signals must be a solution to problem (11)-(13).”
Information Acquisition and Welfare (2014, background): “The results in (24), or equivalently in (26), can in turn be used to identify primitive conditions under which the precision of private information acquired in equilibrium is inefficiently high or low.”
Business Cycle Dynamics Under Rational Inattention (2015, neutral): “Multiplying the profit function by the discount factor (14), summing over all periods, and taking the expectation conditional on information of the decisionmaker in firm i in period −1 yields the objective of the decision-maker in firm i in period −1.”
Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics: Accommodating Frictions in Coordination (2016, neutral): “(2012) study the role of “uncertainty shocks”, or when Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009), Christiano et al.”
Uncertainty, Information Acquisition and Price Swings in Asset Markets (2015, background): “9See Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009) and Myatt and Wallace (2012) for results regarding information complementarities and multiple equilibria under di¤erent information structures.”