Toeholds, Bid Jumps, and Expected Payoffs in Takeovers

By S. Betton. 2000

410 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fbda80bd2e26a7af272985155fdc5d90347b9b6a

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In Accounting

In Management Science and Operations Research

Citations in the corpus

Board classification and managerial entrenchment: Evidence from the market for corporate control (2008, neutral): “trade-off between bid resistance and deal completion, we follow Betton and Eckbo (2000) and estimate forward-looking bid outcome probabilities in a multinomial logit model as a function of initial bid response, bid features, and characteristics of the target firm.”
Shareholder Investment Horizons and the Market for Corporate Control (2005, neutral): “This abnormal return-based measure of premium, although common in the MA Officer, 2003).”
The Toehold Puzzle (2005, neutral): “The source of our toehold information is SDC, the Wall Street Journal, and Betton and Eckbo (2000).”
Negotiations Under the Threat of an Auction (2010, neutral): “For example, Betton and Eckbo (2000) report, for a sample of 1,353 tender offers for the period 1971−1990, that the initial bidder won the contest in 864 (over 63%) of the cases, and”
Institutional Cross-Ownership and Corporate Strategy: The Case of Mergers and Acquisitions (2018, neutral): “…rare in the U.S., however, but has been the subject of considerable research (e.g., Mikkelson and Ruback, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Betton and Eckbo, 2000; Goldman and Qian, 2005; Povel and Sertsios, 2014).6 Our empirical evidence demonstrates that the externality of general…”
Cross-border takeovers, corruption, and related aspects of governance (2006, neutral): “The number of bidders and hostile takeovers can also be associated with higher premiums (Betton and Eckbo, 2000), although the evidence for hostile mergers is mixed (Schwert, 2000).”
Investor Protection, Equity Returns, and Financial Globalization (2009, background): “19For example, in the context of takeovers, Betton and Eckbo (2000) show that bidders, who by definition have a control interest, are likely to trade in the open market by acquiring a toehold.”
One Share - One Vote: The Theory (2007, background): “For instance, Betton and Eckbo (2000) report that, among all US tender o¤er contests between 1971 and 1990, 62 percent involved only one bid.”
Do Auctions Induce a Winner's Curse? New Evidence from the Corporate Takeover Market (2008, background): “Theory by Fishman (1988) and empirical work by Betton and Eckbo (2000) indicate that target managers are more likely to resist low-premium offers.”
Takeover Contests with Asymmetric Bidders (2006, neutral): “The run-up and markup around bids that eventually fail erodes within six months, suggesting that target shareholders would, on average, benefit from accepting such bids [the combined run-up and markup is about 20%, see Schwert (1996, Figure 2); for similar evidence, see Betton and Eckbo (2000) ].”
Causes and consequences of goodwill impairment losses (2011, background): “firm (Bradley et al. 1988), and (4) variables that reflect premium paid to acquire corporate control‐specifically, acquirer toehold, target termination fees, and size of the acquiring firm are associated with higher premium, while tender offer acquisitions and target firm size are associated with lo”
Investment Banks as Insiders and the Market for Corporate Control (2009, neutral): “Ritter and Zhang (2007) show that lead underwriters allocate hot IPOs to affiliated funds, and Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2000) show that NASDAQ market makers belonging to a financial group support the stock prices of those firms the IPOs of which have been underwritten by the investment bank…”