CARAVAN: Providing Location Privacy for VANET

By Krishna Sampigethaya, Leping Huang, Mingyan Li, Radha Poovendran, Kanta Matsuura, Kaoru Sezaki. 2005

474 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fb10495488bfc72edaf63bd17bc7963b34b6cefe

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Citations in the corpus

Securing vehicular ad hoc networks (2007, background): “In the case of non-safety related applications in which vehicles communicate with the infrastructure, the CARAVAN scheme [34] allows vehicles to preserve their privacy by forming groups in which the group leader acts as a proxy on behalf of all group members that access the infrastructure.”
A Security and Privacy Review of VANETs (2015, methodology): “More performance evaluation of these schemes should be conducted on a large-scale VANET, with varying vehicle mobility models, like creating a stronger threat model in which an adversary can utilize more character factors to track a vehicle.”
AMOEBA: Robust Location Privacy Scheme for VANET (2007, methodology): “A preliminary version of this work [42] was presented in the workshop on Embedded Security in Cars (ESCAR), Cologne, Germany, Nov.”
Technical Privacy Metrics (2015, background): “ track a target’s location over time. The adversary’s tracking ability is measured by the maximum tracking time, defined as the cumulative time that the size of the target u’s anonymity set remains 1 [119]. priv MTT ≡Cumulative time when |AS u|= 1 This metric tends to overestimate a target’s privacy”
Preserving privacy in gps traces via uncertainty-aware path cloaking (2007, background): “Thus, several best effort location data protection algorithms have been suggested [7, 39, 36, 27, 8], which have in common that they create areas of confusion where the traces from several users converge.”
Virtual trip lines for distributed privacy-preserving traffic monitoring (2008, background): “There are many best effort approaches [14, 54, 45, 35, 15] that degrade information in a controlled way before releasing it.”
TACKing Together Efficient Authentication, Revocation, and Privacy in VANETs (2009, background): “Such mechanisms would require future work or driver-defined policies to help balance usability (associate keys) and privacy (unlinkability with key changes).”
Survey on VANET security challenges and possible cryptographic solutions (2014, background): “Among VANETs industrial projects [6,48] we cite: VII, CICAS and IVBSS in the USA; CVIS, SafeSPOT, CARAVAN [49], COOPERS, PReVENT, GST, DRiVE, HIGHWAY, FleetNet, SeVeCom [47] and GeoNet in Europe; PREDIT in France; NoW in Allemagne; SmartWay and VIC in Japan; and ITSIndia in India.”
Unraveling an old cloak: k-anonymity for location privacy (2010, methodology): “We note that, decentralized approaches [15] can also be represented by our model, by considering that the cloaking region R is computed by a set of entities (e.”
An Identity-Based Security System for User Privacy in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (2010, background): “In addition, due to the limitation of group formation in VANETs (e.g., too few cars in the vicinity to establish the group), the group-based schemes [8], [13], [14], [15] may not be applied appropriately.”
An Efficient Identity-Based Batch Verification Scheme for Vehicular Sensor Networks (2008, background): “This issue is called linkability, which may incur a location privacy violation problem [19].”
A survey on vehicular cloud computing (2014, unknown): “Furthermore, a trusted certificate authority (CA) is in charge of providing authentication services for vehicles and location-based service providers (Sampigethaya et al., 2005).”
Pseudonym Schemes in Vehicular Networks: A Survey (2015, background): “3) Silent Period Between Change: In AMOEBA [46] and its predecessor CARAVAN [104] a vehicle remains silent after changing its pseudonym.”