Corporate Governance of Banks in Developing Economies: Concepts and Issues

By T. Arun, John D. Turner. 2004

215 citations recorded by the source corpus.

This paper discusses the corporate governance of banking institutions in developing economies. This is an important issue given the essential role that banks play in the financial systems of developing economies and the widespread banking reforms that these economies have implemented. Based on a theoretical discussion of the corporate governance of banks, we suggest that banking reforms can only be fully implemented once a prudential regulatory system is in place. An integral part of banking reforms in developing economies is the privatisation of banks. We suggest that corporate governance reforms may be a prerequisite for the successful divestiture of government ownership. Furthermore, we also suggest that the increased competition resulting from the entrance of foreign banks may improve the corporate governance of developing-economy banks.

Subfields: Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f9e3894664b9eb5e64ff4c077ab3b97be8aa6f78

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Citations in the corpus

Board structure and corporate risk taking in the UK financial sector (2017, background): “Arun & Turner (2004) also indicate that the role of the board of directors is more complicated and challenging in the financial sector.”
Ownership concentration and bank profitability (2017, unknown): “…influences the profitability of firms is examined by a fairly large literature with rather mixed results depending on the context examined (Arun & Turner, 2004; Choi & Hasan, 2005; Chen, Harford & Li, 2007), and such studies focus largely on foreign ownership (Greenaway, Guariglia & Yu,…”
The Effect of Board Size and Composition on the Efficiency of UK Banks (2011, background): “A number of studies (e.g. de Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Arun and Turner, 2004; among others) also seem to agree that the agenda of regulatory bodies, which aims to reduce systemic risk, may be in conflict with the value maximization interests of bank shareholders.5 In line with these arguments,…”