Interactions of Commitment and Discretion in Monetary and Fiscal Policies

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Understanding Inflation as a Joint Monetary-Fiscal Phenomenon (2016, background): “If such equilibria are ruled out, then we return to having a bond valuation equation for each country and fiscal policies in one economy carry implications for (59)See Sims (1997), Loyo (1997), Woodford (1998b), Dupor (2000), Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2001a) and Daniel (2001).”
Monetary and Macroprudential Policies (2011, neutral): “See Petit (1989) and Dixit and Lambertini (2003) • Cooperative case: responsibility for macroprudential policy is assigned to central bank • Parameters of two policy rules are chosen as to minimize: 4.”
The Discipline-Enhancing Role of Fiscal Institutions: Theory and Empirical Evidence (2007, background): “First, simultaneity 6 Examples include Tabellini and Alesina (1990), Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997), Peletier, Dur, and Swank (1999), Debrun (2000), Dixit and Lambertini (2003), Manasse (2005), Beetsma and Debrun (2007), and Krogstrup and Wyplosz (2006).”
Monetary and Macroprudential Policies in an Estimated Model with Financial Intermediation (2014, background): “See also Dixit and Lambertini (2003), where the interaction is applied to the case of monetary and scal policy.”
Understanding the Greenspan Standard (2005, background): “More recently, Dixit and Lambertini (2003) study the strategic interaction between fiscal and monetary policymakers.”