Does Disclosure Deter or Trigger Litigation
By Laura Casares Field, Michelle René Lowry, Susan Shu. 2005
588 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f6d90aa2567dbb8401d8afe7126aca8945c755bc
How researchers see this paper
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In Accounting
- K. Hussainey
- Peter D. Wysocki
- Christian Leuz
- Zhihong Chen
- H. Zou
- Andrew Van Buskirk
- Gerard Hoberg
- Jonathan L. Rogers
In Finance
- Peter D. Wysocki
- Christian Leuz
- Andrew Van Buskirk
- Zhihong Chen
- K. Hussainey
- Jennifer Wu Tucker
- H. Zou
- Sarah L. C. Zechman
Citations in the corpus
- Management Earnings Forecasts and Other Forward-Looking Statements (2017, unknown): “5 Next, we build on prior research that finds a negative relation between investor uncertainty and earnings forecast issuance (Waymire 1985; Field et al. 2005).”
- To Guide or Not to Guide? Causes and Consequences of Stopping Quarterly Earnings Guidance*: Causes and Consequences of Stopping Quarterly Earnings Guidance (2010, unknown): “Firms with a greater risk of being sued by shareholders may be inclined to provide guidance, especially warnings, to mitigate litigation risk and its cost (Skinner 1994, 1997; Field, Lowry, and Shu 2005).”
- Analyst Information Discovery and Interpretation Roles: A Topic Modeling Approach (2018, unknown): “(2010) and Field et al. (2005) and measure litigation risk using the standard deviation of monthly returns over the one year prior to the conference call (denoted as LitigRisk).”
- To Guide Or Not to Guide? Causes and Consequences of Stopping Quarterly Earnings Guidance (2008, unknown): “Firms with a greater risk of being sued by shareholders may be inclined to provide guidance, especially warnings, to mitigate litigation risk and its cost (Skinner 1994, 1997; Field et al. 2005).”
- The Economics of Disclosure and Financial Reporting Regulation: Evidence and Suggestions for Future Research (2015, background): “…is mixed and also quite subtle or nuanced, especially when it comes to bad news disclosures (e.g., Kasznik and Lev, 1995; Skinner, 1994, 1997; Francis et al., 1994; Bamber and Cheon, 1998; Johnson et al., 2001, 2007; Field et al., 2005; Rogers and Van Buskirk, 2009; Billings and Cedergren, 2015).”
- Stealth Disclosure of Accounting Restatements (2009, unknown): “mispricing, thus increasing the number of potential plaintiffs (Field et al. 2005; Gande and Lewis 2008).”
- Disclosure Tone and Shareholder Litigation (2011, background): “firms are more likely to be sued, perhaps because they are more likely to provide large settlements (Field et al. 2005).”
- Do Going Concern Audit Reports Protect Auditors from Litigation? A Simultaneous Equations Approach (2013, methodology): “Research shows a positive relation between Turnover and auditor class action lawsuits (Field et al. 2005), but no relation to going concern reporting (Pearson coefficient 1⁄4 0.”
- SEC Enforcement: Does Forthright Disclosure and Cooperation Really Matter? (2012, methodology): “As documented in these papers, the primary benefit to promptly announcing bad news is a reduction in both litigation likelihood and class action settlement amounts (Skinner 1994; Field et al. 2005).”
- The determinants of corporate disclosure: a meta-analysis (2010, background): “argue that there is a positive relationship between size and disclosure, which can be potentially justified by economies of scales ( Field et al. , 2005”
- Measuring Securities Litigation Risk (2012, background): “…(1994a,b), Johnson, Nelson, and Kasznik (2000, 2001), Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough (2002), Frankel, Joos, and Weber (2002), Matsumoto (2002), Field, Lowry, and Shu (2005), Rogers and Van Buskirk (2009a), and Donelson, McInnis, Mergenthaler, and Yu (2010), among others. further in Section…”
- The determinants of forward‐looking information in annual reports of UAE companies (2007, background): “However, large firms might have the incentive for reducing the level of disclosure, more specifically the level of forward-looking information, to avoid litigation costs (Field et al., 2003).”