To Guide or Not to Guide? Causes and Consequences of Stopping Quarterly Earnings Guidance*: Causes and Consequences of Stopping Quarterly Earnings Guidance

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Do Managers Disclose or Withhold Bad News? Evidence from Short Interest (2018, background): “For the test of management guidance, we remove firms that do not issue any earnings guidance in the previous four quarters to minimize the heterogeneity of disclosure policy across firms (Houston, Lev, and Tucker 2010; Kim, Su, and Zhu 2017).”
On Guidance and Volatility (2015, background): “Similarly, Houston, Lev, and Tucker (2010) argue that forecast dispersion reflects greater difficulty in predicting earnings and document a positive relation between guidance cessation and increased dispersion.”
Board interlocks and the diffusion of disclosure policy (2014, methodology): “Other studies (Feng and Koch 2010; Houston, Lev, and Tucker 2010; Chen, Matsumoto, and Rajgopal 2011) show that firm characteristics influence guidance cessation decisions.”