Subjective Probability: The Real Thing

By R. Jeffrey. 2004

285 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f61e74e602f291689185da31855ca45e3886db3a

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Citations in the corpus

Dynamic inference and everyday conditional reasoning in the new paradigm (2013, background): “The inferences by Bayesian conditionalisation in (1) to (4) rely on an assumption called “rigidity” (Sobel, 2004) or “invariance” (Jeffrey, 2004).”
Quantum-Bayesian Coherence (2009, background): “…to this conclusion, not least in importance is a thoroughgoing personalist account of all probabilities (Bernardo, 1994; de Finetti, 1931, 1990; Jeffrey, 2004; Ramsey, 1931; Savage, 1954)—where the “all” in this sentence includes probabilities for quantum measurement outcomes and even the…”
A Quantum-Bayesian Route to Quantum-State Space (2009, background): “Dutch-book coherence [13, 16, 18] as a normative principle requires that an agent’s degrees of belief conform to the usual rules of the probability calculus, and this is a surprisingly powerful constraint when coupled with the agent’s overall belief system [19].”
An introduction to QBism with an application to the locality of quantum mechanics (2013, background): “Unlike Copenhagen, QBism explicitly takes the “subjective” or “judgmental” or “personalist” view of probability,[5-9] which, though common among contemporary statisticians and economists, is still rare among physicists:”
IS IT ALWAYS RATIONAL TO SATISFY SAVAGE'S AXIOMS? (2009, background): “2 See Carnap (1952), Lindley (1965), Levi (1980), and Jeffrey (2004). 3 See, for example, the standard text by Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995), and, for a”