Independent Review of the Operation of Monetary Policy in New Zealand: Report to the Minister of Finance

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Does it Pay to be Transparent? International Evidence from Central Bank Forecasts (2002, unknown): “Transparency may, in such circumstances, also be proxying for a degree of central bank inde- 32 Kohn (2001) and Svensson (2001) include discussions on ownership of the forecast in their respective reports.”
Foreign exchange interventions under inflation targeting: the Czech Experience (2006, unknown): “Moreover, it is not clear, whether the same signal cannot be sent by the central bank in another way, which would be more consistent with the inflation targeting framework (see Svensson, 2001).”
Central Bank Boards Around the World: Why Does Membership Size Differ? (2006, unknown): “For instance, Svensson (2001) notes, in a review of Monetary Policy in New Zealand, that the governor being the single decision-maker worked well, but also that it is “too risky” and recommends a formal monetary policy committee.”
Review of Monetary Policy in South Africa Since 1994 (2007, background): “The predictions have a maximum error of about 1.25 percent (and usually far less).26 The surprise factor has been greater for SA than some other targeting countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Norway and the UK (Bernhardsen and Kloster (2002), p 55).”