What computers still can’t do: a critique of artificial reason
By Bob Welham. 1994
Subfields: Philosophy
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Citations in the corpus
- Measuring and Improving BERT’s Mathematical Abilities by Predicting the Order of Reasoning. (2021, background): “Even though there are some impressive symbolic systems that operate in a relatively narrow domain, the inability to successfully scale them up is sometimes presented as a critique of the good-old-fashioned AI, or GOFAI (Dreyfus et al., 1992).”
- Reasons, Values, Stakeholders: A Philosophical Framework for Explainable Artificial Intelligence (2021, background): “As [75, 76] point out, several ontological and epistemological assumptions inform the choice of features representative of the decision scenario.”
- Ethics of artificial intelligence and robotics (2020, background): “And the evaluation of this vision is subject to dramatic change: In a few decades, we went from the slogans “AI is impossible” (Dreyfus 1972) and “AI is just automation” (Lighthill 1973) to “AI is will solve all problems” (Kurzweil 1999) and “AI may kill us all” (Bostrom 2014).”
- Enactive artificial intelligence: Investigating the systemic organization of life and mind (2009, background): “In response to the frame problem, most embodied AI practitioners have accepted Dreyfus’ (1992) argument that this problem is largely derived from computationalist AI’s focus on abstract reasoning and its reliance on internal representations for explicit world modeling.”