Institutional Investor Stability and Crash Risk: Monitoring versus Short-Termism?
By Jeffrey L. Callen, Xiaohua Fang. 2013
633 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8802b72749958ba750c69ec8b514027a2a6a7f54
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Yiwei Li
- Yeqin Zeng
- Xiaohua Fang
- Jeong‐Bon Kim
- Liandong Zhang
- Jeffrey L. Callen
- Xiaorong Li
- Zheng Wang
In Finance
- Yiwei Li
- Yeqin Zeng
- Jeong‐Bon Kim
- Liandong Zhang
- Xiaohua Fang
- Jeffrey L. Callen
- Zheng Wang
- Xiaorong Li
Citations in the corpus
- Accruals and price crashes (2016, background): “I also find IVOLt to be uncorrelated with CRASHt+1, which is consistent with the finding by Callen and Fang (2013) but differs from the positive”
- Trust and stock price crash risk: evidence from China (2017, methodology): “Following Chen et al. (2001), Hutton et al. (2009) and Kim et al. 2011a, b, 2016 ), we measure stock price crash risk using two proxes: the negative coefficient of skewness of firm-specific weekly reurns ( NCSKEW ) and the crash likelihood measure of the Down-top Volatility ( DUVOL ) of firm-specifi”
- The impact of top executive gender on asset prices: Evidence from stock price crash risk (2019, positive): “(2009) and Callen and Fang (2015), and control for LitigationriskT , which indicates industries with a high litigation risk.”
- CEO Overconfidence and Stock Price Crash Risk (2016, methodology): “We use both the firm–year measure of Callen et al. (2010) and Basu’s (1997) firm-specific coefficient to measure conservatism.”
- Financial Statement Comparability and Expected Crash Risk (2016, positive): “Callen and Fang (2013) suggest that monitoring by institutional investors can reduce a firm's crash risk. Yu (2008) finds that firms with high analyst coverage engage less in opportunistic earnings management.”
- Institutional Investors, Risk/Performance and Corporate Governance (2015, background): “All rights reserved. investors in this scenario (Callen & Fang, 2013; Gorter & Bikker, 2013).”
- CEO age and stock price crash risk (2017, background): “The literature generally ascribes stock price crashes to the failure of corporate governance control systems to alleviate agency problems (Andreou et al., 2016; Callen and Fang, 2013; Hutton et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2011a; Kim and Zhang, 2016).”
- Retail investor attention and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China (2019, background): “Following Callen and Fang (2013), Xu et al. (2014), and Chang et al. (2017), we exclude (1) firms with fewer than 30 weeks of stock return data in a fiscal year, (2) financial services”
- Short interest and stock price crash risk (2015, methodology): “Finally, based on Callen and Fang (2013b), we control for the number of religious adherents to the total population in the state (RELT) where the firm’s headquarter is located as a measure of religious social norms.”
- Crash Risk and the Auditor-Client Relationship (2017, methodology): “(2011a) and Callen and Fang (2013) suggest that firms with weaker monitoring mechanisms are prone to conceal bad news, and suffer crash risk.”
- Independent Director Reputation Incentives and Stock Price Informativeness (2017, neutral): “(2011); Callen and Fang (2013).”