Market Transparency and the Accounting Regime

By Alexander Bleck, Xuewen Liu. 2007

338 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f38623908f98f92a48eb746e82389ad67472b2b9

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Citations in the corpus

Financial Statement Comparability and Expected Crash Risk (2016, neutral): “Link between financial statement comparability and ex ante crash risk Prior studies often attribute firm-specific stock price crash risk to sudden releases of bad news previously hoarded by managers (Bleck and Liu, 2007; Hutton et al., 2009).”
CFOs versus CEOs: Equity Incentives and Crashes (2011, positive): “4 Though not focusing on equity incentives, Jin and Myers (2006) and Bleck and Liu (2007) offer more analysis of how bad news hoarding can lead to stock price crashes.”
Corporate Tax Avoidance and Stock Price Crash Risk: Firm-Level Analysis (2011, positive): “As a result, unprofitable projects are kept alive for too long and their poor performance accumulates over time, until an asset price crash occurs (Bleck and Liu, 2007).”
The effect of CEO inside debt holdings on financial reporting quality (2015, neutral): “Recent theoretical and empirical evidence (Jin and Myers 2006; Bleck and Liu 2007; Hutton et al. 2009; Kim et al. 2011) reveals that high financial reporting quality mitigates firm-specific stock price crash risk.”
Fair Value Accounting for Financial Instruments: Does It Improve the Association Between Bank Leverage and Credit Risk? (2013, positive): “This finding is consistent with the theoretical model developed by Bleck and Liu (2007), which shows that historical costs can mask a firm’s true economic performance, while fair values can provide an earlier warning of poor performance.”
Analyst coverage, optimism, and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China (2013, background): “While our bad news release view is similar to the bad news hoarding theory of stock price crashes (Jin and Myers, 2006; Bleck and Liu, 2007), we focus on analysts' behavior rather than corporate insiders'.”
Is Historical Cost Accounting a Panacea? Market Stress, Incentive Distortions, and Gains Trading (2015, neutral): “Bleck and Liu (2007) theoretically examine, in a signaling framework, the economic consequences of MTM and HCA.”
CEO Overconfidence and Stock Price Crash Risk (2016, neutral): “Using a traditional agency theory framework, a growing body of recent theoretical and empirical research has identified a variety of firm characteristics that are determinants or precursors of stock price crashes (Benmelech et al. 2010; Bleck and Liu 2007; DeFond et al. 2015; Hutton et al. 2009; Jin”
CEO age and stock price crash risk (2017, neutral): “strong future performance does not materialize (Bleck and Liu, 2007; Jin and Myers, 2006).”
Corporate Governance and Firm-Specific Stock Price Crashes (2016, neutral): “…the disclosure of bad news is unsustainable for long periods and will eventually lead to significant stock price crashes when the true fundamentals unexpectedly reveal an enormous amount of negative information in the market [Bleck and Liu (2007); Callen and Fang (2013); Kim and Zhang (2015)].”
Financial Reporting Opacity and Expected Crash Risk: Evidence from Implied Volatility Smirks (2014, neutral): “Moreover, Bleck and Liu (2007) develop a model that predicts that opacity in financial reporting hinders shareholder ability to discriminate good from bad projects at an early stage.”
Does Mandatory IFRS Adoption Affect Crash Risk (2015, neutral): “Prior research suggests that the financial reporting environment is an important determinant of crash risk (Jin and Myers, 2006; Bleck and Liu, 2007; Hutton et al., 2009).”
Abnormal real operations, real earnings management, and subsequent crashes in stock prices (2014, neutral): “Furthermore, as argued by Bleck and Liu (2007) and Kim et al. (2011b), hiding negative growth prospects prevents investors and board of directors from discovering, and then forcing abandonment of, negative NPV projects in a timely manner. The long-lasting inefficient allocation of resources can incr”