Helios: Web-based Open-Audit Voting
By Ben Adida. USENIX Security Symposium, 2008
845 citations recorded by the source corpus.
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f31411fd1fb0078f8e3e277f1df6a462ce7ce6a4
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
- Tianhao Wang
- Dan Boneh
- Benedikt Bünz
- Ninghui Li
- Eleftherios Kokoris-Kogias
- Somesh Jha
- Henry Corrigan-Gibbs
- Min Xu
Citations in the corpus
- Riposte: An Anonymous Messaging System Handling Millions of Users (2015, background): “), though most e-voting systems cannot provide the forward security property that Riposte offers (Section III-C) [1], [18], [32], [45], [46], [65], [69].”
- Proofs-of-delay and randomness beacons in Ethereum (2017, background): “in some non-latency sensitive applications such as generating cryptographic parameters [5] or election auditing [2], but it is likely not acceptable in”
- Practical and Robust Privacy Amplification with Multi-Party Differential Privacy (2019, background): “, e-voting [5], private messaging [44]), to provide a better trust model.”
- Security Analysis of the Estonian Internet Voting System (2014, methodology): “[1,9]) use cryptographic techniques to achieve a property called end-to-end (E2E) verifiability [8].”
- A Smart Contract for Boardroom Voting with Maximum Voter Privacy (2017, methodology): “They use the Helios voting system [1] whose bulletin board is implemented as a single web server.”
- Scalable Bias-Resistant Distributed Randomness (2017, background): “consensus [46], electronic voting [1], random sharding of nodes into groups [35], and non-interactive client-puzzles [37].”
- ANONIZE: A Large-Scale Anonymous Survey System (2014, unknown): “[7], [8] on the other hand do provide both the anonymity and the authenticity properties we require; however, they do not allow for the authenticated users to be selected ad-hoc for multiple elections.”