Fiscal incentives and policy choices of local governments: Evidence from China

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Do land revenue windfalls create a political resource curse? Evidence from China ☆ (2016, background): “The local governments eagerly tapped this new source of “extra-budgetary” financing (Han and Kung, 2015), which then flooded the local coffers.”
Local Crowding‐Out in China (2020, unknown): “For a study using simulated instruments to study the fiscal incentives of Chinese local governments, see Li and Kai-Sing Kung (2015). panel reports the first stage estimates, showing that the instruments are correlated with the endogenous variables, and that the correlations are not weak.”
Career Incentives of City Leaders and Urban Spatial Expansion in China (2020, background): “There is a small but growing body of recent literature on land development and regulations in urban China (Deng et al., 2008; Lichtenberg & Ding, 2009; Han & Kung, 2015; Brueckner et al., 2017; Cai, Wang, & Zhang, 2017).”
Implementation of a multi-agent environmental regulation strategy under Chinese fiscal decentralization: An evolutionary game theoretical approach (2019, background): “The fiscal decentralization literature (Han and Kung, 2015; He, 2015; Yang, 2016) has made systematic advances in modeling the overlay of incentives between governmental layers in China, but has largely failed to model the strategic dynamics of environmental regulation and firm behavior that drive e”