Updating preferences with multiple priors

By Eran Hanany, Peter Klibanoff. 2006

196 citations recorded by the source corpus.

We propose and axiomatically characterize dynamically consistent update rules for decision making under ambiguity. These rules apply to the preferences with multiple priors of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), and are the first, for any model of preferences over acts, to be able to reconcile typical behavior in the face of ambiguity (as exemplified by Ellsberg’s paradox) with dynamic consistency for all non-null events. Updating takes the form of applying Bayes’ rule to subsets of the set of priors, where the specific subset depends on the preferences, the conditioning event, and the choice problem (i.e., a feasible set of acts together with an act chosen from that set).

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f2cf54440d1c52042ee1cdcf70733de8a27d7c26

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Artificial Intelligence

  1. Massimo Marinacci
  2. Peter Klibanoff
  3. Eran Hanany
  4. Simon Grant
  5. David Kelsey
  6. Sujoy Mukerji
  7. Fabio Maccheroni
  8. Jürgen Eichberger

In Economics and Econometrics

  1. Peter Klibanoff
  2. Marciano M. Siniscalchi
  3. Massimo Marinacci
  4. Eran Hanany
  5. Fabio Maccheroni
  6. Sujoy Mukerji
  7. M. Machina
  8. Nabil I. Al-Najjar

In General Decision Sciences

  1. Peter Klibanoff
  2. Marciano M. Siniscalchi
  3. Massimo Marinacci
  4. Eran Hanany
  5. Fabio Maccheroni
  6. M. Machina
  7. Sujoy Mukerji
  8. Nabil I. Al-Najjar

Citations in the corpus