Political Careers or Career Politicians
By Andrea Mattozzi, Antonio Merlo. 2008
316 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f2b813e267283b6531d419b9405433b626563de6
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Salomé Baslandze
- F. Lotti
- M. Draca
- Ufuk Akcigit
- Jordi Blanes i Vidal
- Panu Poutvaara
- Kaisa Kotakorpi
- Brian K. Richter
In Political Science and International Relations
In Strategy and Management
- M. Draca
- Ufuk Akcigit
- Christian Fons-Rosen
- Jordi Blanes i Vidal
- F. Lotti
- Panu Poutvaara
- Kaisa Kotakorpi
Citations in the corpus
- Connecting to Power: Political Connections, Innovation, and Firm Dynamics (2018, background): “Relatedly, seminal works by Murphy et al. (1991) and Shleifer and Vishny (2002) focus on the problem of occupation choice between high-productivity sectors (entrepreneurs, engineers, etc.”
- Pay for Politicians and Candidate Selection: An Empirical Analysis (2011, background): “(2004), Caselli and Morelli (2004), Messner and Polborn (2004), Poutvaara and Takalo (2007) and Matozzi and Merlo (2008) .”
- MPs for Sale? Returns to Office in Postwar British Politics (2009, unknown): “…of office holding also appears as an important parameter in numerous recent political economy models that examine the selection and behavior of politicians (e.g., Besley 2005; 2006; Caselli and Morelli 2004; Dal Bó, Dal Bó, and Di Tella 2006; Mattozzi and Merlo 2007; Messner and Polborn 2004).”
- Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives from Selection (2013, unknown): “…of the political sector to show that, if high-skilled citizens have a comparative advantage in entering politics—for instance, because of higher post-congressional returns, as in Mattozzi and Merlo (2008)—paying politicians more may have a crowding-out effect and decrease the average quality.”
- Revolving door lobbyists (2012, background): “…often put forward by lobbyists themselves, is that the importance of individuals with prior government experience is due to higher innate ability (Burger 2006; see also Diermeier et al. 2005 and Matozzi and Merlo 2008) and/or human capital accumulation (Salisbury et al. 1989, Eggen and Kindy 2009).”