Does CEO Duality Really Affect Corporate Performance

By Khaled Elsayed. 2007

394 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f23aac3a2cb6c3ac4bc90ec673b35a1623e54045

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Citations in the corpus

State ownership and firm performance: Empirical evidence from Chinese listed companies (2013, neutral): “A firm’s assets or employee numbers have been widely used in the literature to measure firm size, as in studies by Judge et al. (2003), Dahya and McConnell (2007), Ehikioya (2009), Faleye (2007) and Elsayed (2007).”
Corporate governance and firms financial performance in the United Kingdom (2020, background): “CEO duality In some companies, a CEO may have two functions; he serves as chairperson of the board of directors and as executive manager (Elsayed, 2007).”
Corporate governance and cash holdings in MENA: Evidence from internal and external governance practices (2017, neutral): “Elsayed (2007) highlights the impact of CEO duality in Egypt using 92 firms.”
Examining the influence of corporate governance on intellectual capital efficiency: Evidence from top service firms in Australia (2015, background): “, 2010) and countries such as the USA (Boyd, 1995; Elsayed, 2007).”
Corporate governance, capital structure and firm performance: Evidence from Thailand (2017, background): “…related to prior studies that examine the effect of corporate governance on firm performance in developing economies (e.g., Connelly et al., 2012; Elsayed, 2007; Jackling and Johl, 2009) and to those addressing the similar issue in the context of advanced economies (e.g., Bhagat and Bolton,…”
Do board characteristics drive firm performance? An international perspective (2019, background): “A positive relation is obtained by Kota and Tomar (2010) for companies in India, and Elsayed (2007) in Egypt, a negative relation was found for Nigeria (Ehikioya 2009) and Russia (Judge et al.) and no relation was obtained by Baliga and Moyer (1996) for the United States or Lin et al. (2009) for…”
Revisiting Agency Theory: Evidence of Board Independence and Agency Cost from Bangladesh (2015, methodology): “Following this argument, and consistent with Pi and Timme (1993), Kula (2005), Elsayed (2007) and Kholeif (2008), this study considers institutional ownership (INSTOWN) as a control variable, measured by the percentage of shares owned by financial institutions.”