Consequences, Action, and Intention as Factors in Moral Judgments: An fMRI Investigation

By Jana Schaich Borg, Catherine Hynes, J. V. Horn, Scott T. Grafton, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 2006

373 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Social Psychology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f1c473d05056bdb747462713342883058a426665

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Cognitive Neuroscience

1. Joshua D. Greene
2. Liane L. Young
3. Fiery Cushman
4. Rebecca Saxe
5. J. Cohen
6. Leigh E. Nystrom
7. Kristin Smith-Crowe
8. Lorella Lotto

In Social Psychology

1. Joshua D. Greene
2. Liane L. Young
3. Fiery Cushman
4. Rebecca Saxe
5. J. Cohen
6. Lorella Lotto
7. Andrea Manfrinati
8. Michela Sarlo

Citations in the corpus

• Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment. (2008, background): “These mechanisms may be sensitive to familiar moral distinctions, such as the distinction between harmful actions and omissions (Cushman et al., 2006; Haidt & Baron, 1996; Schaich Borg, Hynes, Van Horn, Grafton, & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2006) and the distinction between harms that are intended and those”
• The Neural Correlates of Third-Party Punishment (2008, neutral): “Indeed, while moral decision-making studies to date have focused on assessing brain function during decisions about the moral rightness or wrongness of actions depicted in written scenarios, they have not specifically addressed the issue of punishment (Borg et al., 2006; Greene et al., 2001, 2004; H”
• Pushing moral buttons: the interaction between personal force and intention in moral judgment. (2009, background): “…the distinction between harm intended as a means to a greater good (as in the footbridge dilemma) and harm that is a foreseen but “unintended” side-effect of achieving a greater good (as in the switch dilemma) (Cushman et al., 2006; Hauser et al., 2007; Mikhail, 2000; Schaich Borg et al., 2006).”
• Sleep deprivation reduces default mode network connectivity and anti-correlation during rest and task performance (2012, background): “The IPL region is implicated in diverse cognitive operations (Laird et al., 2009), including bodily awareness (Felician et al., 2009), generating a sense of personal responsibility (Schaich Borg et al., 2006), and moral decision-making (Raine and Yang, 2006).”
• Psychological Antecedents to Socially Responsible Behavior (2008, neutral): “endangering one person to save the lives of many) (Borg et al., 2006).”
• A New Set of Moral Dilemmas: Norms for Moral Acceptability, Decision Times, and Emotional Salience (2014, background): “Indeed, when testing the influence of the DDE on moral judgments, several studies demonstrated a pattern of results consistent with such moral principle, in that participants were much less likely to cause harm intentionally than unintentionally (Borg et al. 2006; Cushman et al. 2006; Moore, Clark, ”
• 13 Ethical Decision Making: Where We’ve Been and Where We’re Going (2008, background): “( 2006 ), Borg and her colleagues (Borg, Hynes, Horn, Grafton, & Sinnott‐Armstrong, 2006 ) studied individuals’ reactions to scenarios representing different principles, but rather than focusing on participants’ external responses, they examined participants’ brain activity via fMRI (functional mag”
• Cultural differences in responses to real-life and hypothetical trolley problems (2014, neutral): “Previous experiments on actions in moral dilemmas, including O’Neill and Petrinovich (1998), have asked participants to predict their own behavior (see also Bar-tels, 2008; Schaich Borg et al., 2006).”