Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market

By Asim Ijaz Khwaja, Atif R. Mian. 2005

2,425 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Sociology and Political Science, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f1b376d27d367cc346c6233cc3b1eefe1d24c4d3

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Citations in the corpus

Accrual-based and real earnings management and political connections (2015, background): “For example, politically-connected firms get easier access to debt financing and lower taxation (e.g. Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Claessens et al., 2008; Faccio, 2010; Goldman et al., 2013), have preferential access to government contracts (Goldman et al., 2009), or have…”
When does investment in political ties improve firm performance? The contingent effect of innovation activities (2014, background): “For instance, studies have examined how political ties help in securing government subsidy (Wu & Cheng, 2011), access bank finance (Claessens et al., 2008; Faccio, 2006; Khwaja & Mian, 2005), and being bailed out (Faccio et al., 2006).”
Connecting to Power: Political Connections, Innovation, and Firm Dynamics (2018, background): “…including the US, the UK, France, Italy, Turkey, China, Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea, Thailand, and Singapore (Fisman, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Fan et al., 2007; Cingano and 4Some prominent examples of endogenous growth models without…”
Politicians and the IPO decision: The impact of impending political promotions on IPO activity in China (2014, background): “public company; however, in many settings, including China, access to external capital is dependent upon the existence of strong political connections (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Piotroski, Wong and Wu, 2012).”
Portfolios of Political Ties and Business Group Strategy in Emerging Economies (2014, neutral): “In terms of market entry activities, we show that external resources and firms’ links to them are also influential in market entry because these resources and ties modify firms’ internal resource profiles and external competitive environments (Peng and Luo, 2000; Fisman, 2001; Khwaja and Mian, 2005;”
Sudden Deaths: Taking Stock of Geographic Ties (2007, background): “2These include Johnson and Mitton (2003) and Khwaja and Mian (2005) on preferential access to credit; Dinç (2005) on preferential treatment by government owned enterprises; Stigler (1971) and Kroszner and Stratmann (1998) on regulation; and Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) on government…”
Finance, Financial Sector Policies, and Long-Run Growth (2008, background): “Furthermore, there is no evidence that stateowned banks help the poor; rather, state-owned banks tend to funnel credit to politically favored and commercially unviable projects (Sapienza, 2004; Cole, 2005; Dinc, 2005; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2006a).”
Electoral Cycles in Savings Bank Lending (2017, neutral): “Similarly, Khwaja and Mian (2005) find that politically connected firms in Pakistan have easier access to credit but that this preferential treatment is only granted by government banks, and Dinç (2005) shows that the lending behavior of public banks in developing countries depends on the timing of…”