Learning dynamics in social dilemmas

By Michael W. Macy, A. Flache. 2002

649 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

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Citations in the corpus

Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning in Sequential Social Dilemmas (2017, background): “However, the MGSD formalism ignores several aspects of real world social dilemmas which may be of critical importance.”
Learning to cooperate in multi-agent social dilemmas (2006, neutral): “(1 - a)Q(a , a ) + a · r + .”
Evolutionary games on graphs (2006, background): “th players should play defection, since this is the Nash equilibrium. However, this outcome would provide them with the second worst income, thus creating the dilemma. There are other Social Dilemmas Macy and Flache (2002); Skyrms (2003) where mutual cooperation could provide the highest total incom”
Cooperation Prevails When Individuals Adjust Their Social Ties (2006, background): “Depending on the relative ordering of these four payoff values and assuming that mutual cooperation is preferred over mutual defection, three well-known social dilemmas emerge [9]—the snowdrift game (SG) (T .”
The structure and dynamics of multilayer networks (2014, background): “However, cooperation is hampered by the players’ ‘‘Temptation’’ to defect, since defecting against a cooperator yields more payoff than cooperating (T = b > 1), and by the risk arising from cooperating with a defector, as it yields the lowest payoff, usually called ‘‘Suckers’’, (S = 0) [337].”
Human strategy updating in evolutionary games (2010, background): “[17] Macy, MW, Flache, A (2002) Learning dynamics in social dilemmas.”
Micro-Macro Links and Microfoundations in Sociology (2011, methodology): “For example, Macy and Flache (2002) employ a learning model for the analysis of conditions for cooperation, whereas Trivers (1971) and Axelrod (1984) provide well-known variants of evolutionary models of cooperation.”
Punish, but not too hard: how costly punishment spreads in the spatial public goods game (2010, neutral): “A social dilemma is a situation where actions that ensure or enhance individual prosperity harm the well-being on the collective level [1].”
Win-Stay-Lose-Learn Promotes Cooperation in the Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma Game (2012, background): “Indeed, the subtle role of aspirations in evolutionary games has recently received a lot of attention [65–73], and”
Maintaining cooperation in complex social dilemmas using deep reinforcement learning (2017, background): “3 Outside of deep RL there is a large body of theoretical (Axelrod, 2006; Fudenberg & Maskin, 1986), simulation-based (Nowak, 2006; Macy & Flache, 2002) and experimental (Bó, 2005; Fudenberg et al., 2012) work studying the emergence of bilateral cooperation.”