Code-Red: a case study on the spread and victims of an internet worm

By David Moore, Colleen Shannon, K. Claffy. 2002

968 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Citations in the corpus

Modeling Botnet Propagation Using Time Zones (2006, background): “For example, Code Red is one such worm, which nished its infection in 14 hours [ Moo02a ].”
An Inside Look at Botnets (2007, background): “characterized the Code Red I/II worm outbreaks in [29] and the Sapphire/Slammer worm outbreak [2 7] providing key details on propagation methods and infection rates.”
Secure or insure?: a game-theoretic analysis of information security games (2008, background): “The " I Love You " virus [27], Code Red [29] and Slammer worms [28], to cite the most famous cases, have infected hundreds of thousands of machines and caused, all together, billions of dollars in damages.”
Measurements and Mitigation of Peer-to-Peer-based Botnets: A Case Study on Storm Worm (2008, methodology): “This propagation mechanism is used for example by CodeRed [21], Slammer [20], and all common IRC bots [3].”
A Virtual Honeypot Framework (2004, methodology): “We simulate worm propagation based on the parameters for a Code-Red like worm [15, 17].”
Understanding the Mirai Botnet (2017, background): “While randomized default passwords would be a first step, it is likely that attacks of the future will evolve to target software vulnerabilities in IoT devices much like the early Code Red and Confickr worms [8, 70].”
Automated Worm Fingerprinting (2004, background): “To monitor random scanning worms from a global perspective, one approach is to use network telescopes (cid:150) passive network monitors that observe large ranges of unused, yet routable, address space [25, 22, 26].”
A Survey on Malware Detection Using Data Mining Techniques (2017, background): “Just like the physical world, there are people with malicious intentions (i.e., cyber-criminals) on the Internet.”
Preventing Internet denial-of-service with capabilities (2004, background): “The CodeRed and follow-on viruses have demonstrated repeatedly that it is possible to recruit millions of machines to the task of sending normal HTTP requests to a single destination [13] [12].”
Misleading worm signature generators using deliberate noise injection (2006, unknown): “, CodeRed[12], Slammer[11], etc.”
A survey of coordinated attacks and collaborative intrusion detection (2010, background): “It infected over 359,000 machines within 14 h (Moore et al., 2002).”
The monitoring and early detection of Internet worms (2005, unknown): “In the case of Code Red, more than 359 000 Code Red infected hosts were observed on July 19, 2001 by CAIDA [27].”
Countering code-injection attacks with instruction-set randomization (2003, background): “Because such attacks can be launched over a network, they are regularly used to break into hosts or as an infection vector for computer worms [55, 4, 9, 10, 46, 64].”