Preventing Internet denial-of-service with capabilities

By T. Anderson, Timothy Roscoe, David Wetherall. Computer communication review, 2004

349 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/241747d09fb40c6fd731afa2e3bd58f9b8327c6b

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In Artificial Intelligence

In Computer Networks and Communications

Citations in the corpus

RouteBricks: exploiting parallelism to scale software routers (2009, methodology): “This is true, for example, of application accelerati on [13], measurement and logging [8], encryption [1], filtering and i ntrusion detection [14], as well as a variety of more forward-loo king research proposals [ 21 , 36, 39].”
Botz-4-sale: surviving organized DDoS attacks that mimic flash crowds (2005, neutral): “Only packets with the rig ht capabilities are delivered to the destination [11].”
A Survey of Defense Mechanisms Against Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Flooding Attacks (2013, methodology): “StopIt architecture: How it installs filters on the sources of attack upon detecting the DDoS attack [95].”
A DoS-limiting network architecture (2005, methodology): “In earlier work, we proposed the approach of putting a capabi lity, or token, into each data packet to demonstrate that the packe t was requested by the receiver [2].”
SIFF: a stateless Internet flow filter to mitigate DDoS flooding attacks (2004, background): “present a capability-based approach, where a sender first needs to obtain a capability from the infrastructure to send traffic to a receiver [5].”
SANE: A Protection Architecture for Enterprise Networks (2006, background): “4request capabilities are similar to network capabilities as discussed in [12, 51] 5We use the same IV for all layers—as opposed to picking a new random IV for each layer—to reduce the capability’s overall size.”
Overcoming the Internet impasse through virtualization (2005, background): “, see [24, 22, 3, 9, 27, 23, 7, 4, 6, 5, 28, 8]), the prospects for significant change in the Internet architecture appear slim.”
A taxonomy of DDoS attack and DDoS defense mechanisms (2004, background): “On the extreme end, systems that test client legitimacy and allow access to the system only to legitimate clients belong in this category [22, 42, 1, 57, 3].”