Simple Estimators for the Parameters of Discrete Dynamic Games (with Entry/Exit Examples)

By Ariel Pakes, Michael Ostrovsky, Steven T. Berry. 2007

538 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f130c3f2c2b6abf252a3550a5b5a0a62c0d18aa5

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Á. D. Paula
2. Hiroyuki Kasahara
3. Stephen Ryan
4. Katsumi Shimotsu
5. Patrick Bajari
6. Han Hong
7. Mitsuru Igami
8. J. Porter

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Patrick Bajari
2. Á. D. Paula
3. Philipp Schmidt-Dengler
4. Han Hong
5. Ariel Pakes
6. Katherine Ho
7. J. Porter
8. Mitsuru Igami

In Marketing

1. Á. D. Paula
2. Hiroyuki Kasahara
3. Stephen Ryan
4. Katsumi Shimotsu
5. Philipp Schmidt-Dengler
6. Patrick Bajari
7. J. Porter
8. Katherine Ho

Citations in the corpus

• Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Choice Models in Continuous Time with an Application to Retail Competition (2016, unknown): “Using our framework, the two-step estimators of Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002) (2007), Bajari et al. (2007), Hotz et al. (1994), Pakes et al. (2007), and Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) can be applied in continuous time.”
• Dynamic Discrete Choice Structural Models: A Survey (2010, unknown): “…has a straightforward expression when the ε0s have independent extreme value distributions, as well as in binary choice models when unobservables have normal or exponential distributions (see Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and Pakes et al (2007) for examples in the context of dynamic games).”
• Spatial competition with endogenous location choices: An application to discount retailing (2009, unknown): “First, the incomplete information assumption in a static game implies that players are allowed to have ex post regret about their decisions, which naturally leads to dynamic considerations (Aguirregabiria and Mira 2004; Pakes et al. 2004 ).”
• Asymptotic Least Squares Estimators for Dynamic Games (2008, background): “Martin Pesendorfer thanks the NSF under grant SES 0214222 for financial support.”
• Estimating Static Models of Strategic Interactions (2010, background): “Recent contributions include Haile, Hortacsu, and Kosenok (2008), Aradillas-Lopez (2008), Ho (2009), Ishii (2008), Pakes et al. (2007), Augereau, Greenstein, and Rysman (2006), Seim (2006), Sweeting (2008), and Tamer (2003).”
• Econometric Analysis of Games with Multiple Equilibria (2012, methodology): “Common estimation strategies for dynamic games such as those presented by Aguirregabiria & Mira (2007), Bajari et al. (2007), Pakes et al. (2007), and Pesendorfer & Schmidt-Dengler (2008) adapt well-known procedures for the estimation of single-agent Markov decision problems, such as that by…”