Estimating Static Models of Strategic Interactions

By Patrick Bajari, Han Hong, John R. Krainer, Denis Nekipelov. 2010

274 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/852255d06b0cddb535b8dbaf04aed1fd0f1a885d

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Citations in the corpus

The Strategic Timing Incentives of Commercial Radio Stations: An Empirical Analysis Using Multiple Equilibria (2009, background): “Columns (9) and (10) allow for persistent unobserved station heterogeneity in non-strategic preferences (β:55i = Xiβ:55+ηβ:55 where ηβ:55 ∼ N(0, γ2β:55)).”
Econometric Analysis of Games with Multiple Equilibria (2012, methodology): “Bajari et al. (2010a) present the method in more generality.”
Empirical Entry Games with Complementarities: An Application to the Shopping Center Industry (2012, methodology): “According to Theorem 1 in Bajari et al. (2010) and to Theorem 3 in Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010), as long as there is sufficient variability in the firm-specific shifters, the deterministic part of profits (.) is nonparametrically identified.”
Equilibrium Tuition, Applications, Admissions, and Enrollment in the College Market (2012, unknown): “…games with incomplete information, several studies ðe.g., Aguirregabiria and Mira ½2007 and Bajari, Benkard, and Levin ½2007 in dynamic games and Bajari et al. ½2010 in static gamesÞ use a two-step estimation procedure, assuming that the researcher observes multiple games/markets and that…”
Discrete games with flexible information structures: an application to local grocery markets (2014, background): “For i ∈ {1, 2}, there is of at least one covariate, x∗i that is not included in x−i, and has positive density everywhere on R conditional on all other covariates.”
Semiparametric estimation of a simultaneous game with incomplete information (2010, background): “information game-theoretic models include Brock and Durlauf (2001), Seim (2006), Sweeting (2008), Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008), and Bajari, Hong, Kreiner, and Nekipelov (2009) 1.”
Estimating Network Economies in Retail Chains: A Revealed Preference Approach (2010, methodology): “With these bounds on cf for each firm, we can now use equations (5) and (6) to bound θj for each firm:”