Electoral Competition under the Threat of Political Unrest
By M. Ellman, Léonard Wantchekon. 2000
165 citations recorded by the source corpus.
We study elections in which one party (the strong party) controls a source of political unrest; e.g., this party could instigate riots if it lost the election. We show that the strong party is more likely to win the election when there is less information about its ability to cause unrest. This is because when the weak party is better informed, it can more reliably prevent political unrest by implementing a "centrist" policy. When there is uncertainty over the credibility of the threat, "posturing" by the strong party leads to platform divergence.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f0e744e772fd69885b2ef1108bb775cc1263f440
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In Economics and Econometrics
- Mthuli Ncube
- Kjell Hausken
- A. Chaturvedi
- John C. Anyanwu
- W. Baah-Boateng
- C. Nevo
- Hassan Qudrat-Ullah
In Political Science and International Relations
In Sociology and Political Science
Citations in the corpus
- Rigging elections with violence (2005, background): “In two related papers, Wantchekon and Ellman (2000) and Wantchekon (1999) show how the threat of political unrest (possibly initiated by the political parties themselves) after the election influences voting behavior and equilibrium policy outcomes.”
- Inequality, Economic Growth and Poverty in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) (2014, background): “Among the second group, Kaldor (1956), Partridge (1997), Li and Zou (1998), Forbes (2000), and Nahum (2005) show that inequality does lead to growth. While finding a positive effect, Barro (2000), Banerjee and Duflo (2003), Pagano (2004), Voitchovsky (2005), Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2005), Barro (”