Rigging elections with violence
By A. Chaturvedi. 2005
123 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Political Science and International Relations, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1029c39308e90596af82952ddb9bc0e89083cc97
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Political Science and International Relations
In Safety Research
- Paul Collier
- R. Gutiérrez-Romero
- Pedro C. Vicente
- A. LeBas
- D. Roodman
- Anke Hoeffler
- Nancy Qian
- Jakob Svensson
In Sociology and Political Science
- A. LeBas
- R. Gutiérrez-Romero
- Paul Collier
- Pedro C. Vicente
- Anke Hoeffler
- F. van der ploeg
- Nicholas Sambanis
- S. Poelhekke
Citations in the corpus
- Sabotage in contests: a survey (2015, unknown): “Finally, Chen (2005) considered a specific form of contest: one in which the contestants are employees who compete for promotion to a vacancy in a higher tier of their firm’s hierarchy.”
- Violence, bribery, and fraud: the political economy of elections in Sub-Saharan Africa (2012, background): “5 Our theory is closest to Chaturvedi (2005), who, like us, argues that the use of political violence by a party decreases with its electoral support.”
- Does electoral violence affect vote choice and willingness to vote? Conjoint analysis of a vignette experiment (2020, background): “…to the theoretical literature, politicians often use pre-electoral violence to reduce the turnout of rivals’ supporters, presumably without significantly affecting the voting support and turnout of their core voters (de Figueredo & Weingast, 1999; Chaturvedi, 2005; Collier & Vicente, 2012).”