Private placements and managerial entrenchment

By Michael J. Barclay, Clifford G. Holderness, D. Sheehan. 2007

258 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f08f77ec460e45347012929039a5552464ea5070

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In Accounting

1. David Haushalter
2. Susan J. Chaplinsky
3. Na Dai

In Strategy and Management

1. Na Dai

Citations in the corpus

• Does investor identity matter? An empirical examination of investments by venture capital funds and hedge funds in PIPEs ☆ (2007, background): “Nevertheless, more recent studies, such as Barclay, Holderness, and Sheehan (2003) and Wu (2004), find that private placements of large-percentage blocks of common stock are often made to passive investors that do not monitor the management.”
• Financing Under Extreme Risk: Contract Terms and Returns to Private Investments in Public Equity (2010, background): “The distressed condition 2 Prior empirical studies of discount only private placements include, among others, Wruck, (1989), Hertzel and Smith (1993), Barclay, Holderness, and Sheehan (2007) and Krishnamurthy, Spindt, Subramaniam, and Woidtke (2005) and Wruck and Wu (2006).”
• Venture Capital Conflicts of Interest: Evidence from Acquisitions of Venture-Backed Firms (2010, unknown): “Chang (1998) and Barclay et al. (2007) also argue that the creation of active block holdings can lead to improved firm valuation since concentrated equity owners have stronger incentives to carefully monitor and take action against ineffective management. In a similar vein Hertzel and Smith (1993) r”