Insider Trading Restrictions and Analysts' Incentives to Follow Firms

By Robert M. Bushman, Joe Piotroski, Abbie J. Smith. 2005

282 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f0308976c0c72856ef90efd76d86b562c48aec9e

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

In Finance

Citations in the corpus

Public Pressure and Corporate Tax Behavior (2016, unknown): “financial settings [Bushman et al. 2005; Daske et al. 2008] by highlighting how non-regulator”
Public Pressure and Corporate Tax Behavior (2016, unknown): “Third, this study contributes to research examining the role of enforcement in other financial settings [Bushman et al. 2005; Daske et al. 2008] by highlighting how non-regulator external party scrutiny can facilitate and encourage enforcement efforts that have significant economic implications for…”
The Influence of Analysts, Institutional Investors, and Insiders on the Incorporation of Market, Industry, and Firm-Specific Information into Stock Prices (2004, unknown): “example, Bushman, Piotroski and Smith [2003] document an increase in the depth and breadth of”
Do Analysts Matter for Governance? Evidence from Natural Experiments (2015, background): “There is a battery of literature that has shown that analysts tend to cover higher quality firms (Chung and Jo, 1996) and those with less information asymmetry (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Bhushan, 1989; Bushman et al., 2005).”
Corporate Governance and Blockchains (2017, unknown): “See Fishman and Hagerty (1992) and Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2005).”
The economic value of regulated disclosure: Evidence from the banking sector (2006, methodology): “It reflects the effectiveness of disclosure regulations in enhancing the comprehensiveness, informativeness, timeliness and credibility of financial reports, and, as a construct, it corresponds to Bushman et al. (2004)’s concept of corporate reporting quality.”
Do Local Analysts Know More? A Cross-Country Study of the Performance of Local Analysts and Foreign Analysts (2008, unknown): “We use the data from Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2005).”
When No Law is Better Than a Good Law (2009, unknown): “1”
Analyst Coverage and Earnings Management (2008, background): “The existing literature has shown that analysts tend to cover firms with a better information environment (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Francis, Hanna, and Philbrick, 1998; Bhushan, 1989; and Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith, 2005).”
Do Independent Directors Cause Improvements in Firm Transparency (2014, background): “Prior research documents that analysts tend to cover more transparent firms (e.g., Bhushan, 1989; Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Healy, Hutton, and Palepu, 1999; Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith, 2005).”
Capital-Market Effects of Securities Regulation: Prior Conditions, Implementation, and Enforcement (2016, background): “Subsequent papers using the same events demonstrate other capital-market effects associated with insider trading regulation and enforcement (e.g., Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith 2005; Ackerman, van Halteren, and Maug 2008; Hail, Tahoun, and Wang 2014).”