Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare

By Daniel M. Hausman. 2011

372 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences, Philosophy

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ef88785d54c02172686ded299387ec697288cc6f

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Citations in the corpus

Nudging and Boosting: Steering or Empowering Good Decisions (2017, background): “Genuine motivations are often seen as the proper evidential basis of welfare considerations (e.g., Hausman, 2012).”
Learning the Preferences of Ignorant, Inconsistent Agents (2015, background): “The problem of learning a person’s preferences from observations of their choices features prominently in economics (Hausman 2011), in cognitive science (Baker, Saxe, and Tenenbaum 2011; Ullman et al. 2009), and in applied machine learning (Jannach et al. 2010; Ermon et al. 2014).”
A Review of Nudges: Definitions, Justifications, Effectiveness (2020, neutral): “2 See Berg and Gigerenzer (2010), Hausman (2012), Rebonato (2012, 2014), Heilmann (2014), Barton and GrüneYanoff (2015), Gigerenzer (2015), Guala andMittone (2015), Le Grand andNew (2015),Whitman and Rizzo (2015), Hausman (2016, 2018), Sugden (2018), Rizzo and Whitman (2019), Scoccia (2019), and…”
The Future in Mind: Aspirations and Forward-Looking Behaviour in Rural Ethiopia (2014, background): “The conceptualisations of aspirations in the academic literature largely share this everyday understanding of the concept.”
Preference purification and the inner rational agent: a critique of the conventional wisdom of behavioural welfare economics (2016, methodology): “In this paper, we critically evaluate a response to these problems that has been advocated by many prominent behavioural economists and that has recently been endorsed by Hausman (2012) in a philosophical enquiry into how the concepts of preference, value, choice and welfare are (and ought to be) us”