original papers: On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings

By A. Alkan. 2001

56 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

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A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure (2002, methodology): “Recently Alkan [ 3 ] showed that if one introduces quotas together with a monotonicity condition then the set of stable matchings is a distributive lattice under a natural definition of supremum and infimum for matchings.”
Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences (2013, unknown): “[501, 41–43,398, 117, 189].”
A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets (2004, background): “Alkan (2001, 2002) presents properties (including distributivity) of the lattice structure on pairwise-stable matchings, in many-to-many markets with additional structure on preferences.”
Ranking Sets of Objects (2001, methodology): “A well-known example is a substitutability axiom employed in Roth and Sotomayor [133], and other requirements in the same spirit can be found in Alkan [1] and in Mart́ınez, Massó,”