A Contextual Approach to Scientific Understanding

By H. W. Regt, D. Dieks. Synthese, 2005

320 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Global and Planetary Change, History and Philosophy of Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ee3882e9264602f24dca5d7591227dec1ae991b3

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In Global and Planetary Change

In History and Philosophy of Science

Citations in the corpus

Explanation, understanding, and control (2014, unknown): “…and he argues that by equating understanding with such propositional knowledge (as provided by explanatory accounts such as Woodward’s) EMU has the consequence of making recent theories of understanding (De Regt and Dieks 2005; De Regt 2009; Grimm 2010) redundant with theories of explanation.”
No understanding without explanation (2013, background): “Why not insist, for example, that to understand a phenomenon, you must not only grasp a correct explanation of the phenomenon, but be capable of constructing that explanation from its parts (de Regt and Dieks 2005; de Regt 2009)?”
Functional explaining: a new approach to the philosophy of explanation (2014, background): “Since Wittgenstein et al. (1958) at least, and continuing through modern writers like de Regt and Dieks (2005) and Ylikoski (2009), there has been a pervasive thought that understanding is best characterized by what it enables one to do.”
FOLK ATTRIBUTIONS OF UNDERSTANDING: IS THERE A ROLE FOR EPISTEMIC LUCK? (2016, background): “For example, on the inuential account of De Regt and Dieks (2005), one understands a phenomenon when one can relate it to an intelligible theory, where the intelligibility of a theory is measured by what one can do with it (rather than any particular causal pedigree).”
On scientific understanding with artificial intelligence (2022, methodology): “A phenomenon P can be understood if there exists an intelligible theory T of P such that scientists can recognise qualitatively characteristic consequences of T without performing exact calculations [12, 13].”
Explication as a Method of Conceptual Re-engineering (2016, background): “Explications may also contribute to the explanatory power of a theory, to its ability to be used for predicting novel phenomena or to more specific virtues such as visualizability (see de Regt and Dieks 2005) or the possibility to use it as an effective means to decide on practical problems.”